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In her dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,1
Justice O'Connor issued a dire warning. The trimester framework estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade2 to govern abortion regula-
tion is, she said, no longer workable. Indeed, because the trimester frame-
work was intimately linked to medical technology, recent medical
advances have set it "on a collision course with itself."' In Roe, the Court
held that the Constitution protects a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion. The Court found that during the first trimester, states lack a
compelling interest that would justify regulation of abortion. In so finding,
the Court relied heavily on the fact that up until the twelfth week of
pregnancy, abortion had a lower mortality rate than childbirth.4 After the
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1. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down second trimester hospitalization requirement).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. 410 U.S. at 163. Obstetridans usually calculate the gestational age of a fetus from the first day
of the woman's last menstrual period. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANr, WILLIAMS
OBSrETRIcs 139 (17th ed. 1985). Using this method of calculation, the average duration of pregnancy
is 40 weeks. Id. Medical convention is to divide pregnancy into three three-month intervals, called
trimesters. See J. GREENHILL & E. FRIEDMAN, BIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND MODERN PRACTICE
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time during pregnancy when abortion became more hazardous for women
than childbirth, the state's interest in the woman's health became compel-
ling, and it could regulate to protect this interest.5 When the fetus became
viable, i.e., potentially able to survive outside the womb, albeit with artifi-
cial aid," the state's interest in potential life became compelling, and it
could prohibit all abortions not necessary to preserve the woman's health.'
Thus, two medically determined times-the time when the hazards of
abortion surpassed those of childbirth, and the time of fetal viabil-
ity-appeared to form the structural foundation of the Roe trimester
framework.'
It is this foundation that Justice O'Connor says is now crumbling. At
the time of Akron, abortion had grown safer than childbirth through ap-
proximately week 16. Did this mean that the time when states could
regulate abortion had moved from week 12 to week 16? The Akron ma-
jority said no,' 0 implying that the edifice erected on a base of medical facts
could withstand this erosion of its underpinnings." The Court in Akron
OF OnSTETRICS 122 (1974).
5. 410 U.S. at 163.
6. Id. at 160. This is simply the standard medical definition of the term. The Court relied for this
definition on the then-current edition of a well-known medical text, L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD,
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971).
7. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
8. Although I will speak here of the trimester framework, it is important to recognize that the
Court in Roe never spoke of a second or third trimester. It spoke of a first trimester and then of stages
demarcated by the time of viability. Although viability occurred in 1973 at approximately the end of
the second trimester (in medical terminology), the Court never stated that the stage after viability
would necessarily continue to correspond with the last third of pregnancy for legal purposes. For a
useful discussion of this point, see Special Project: Survey of Abortion Law, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J. 67,
139-42 (emphasizing difference between medical trimesters, which are three equal divisions of preg-
nancy, and the three legal stages delineated in Roe, which were then, but would not necessarily con-
tinue to be, of roughly equal length) [hereinafter cited as Survey of Abortion Law]. The Court, how-
ever, has subsequently used the term "second trimester." Akron, 462 U.S. at 434-37.
9. 462 U.S. at 429 n.11. Abortion was actually safer than childbirth even beyond week 16 by
1983, but the data showing this were not yet available when the Court decided Akron. During the
period of 1972-80, the reported maternal mortality rate was just under 10 per 100,000 live births,
and the estimated maternal mortality rate (based on the widely recognized under-reporting of deaths
associated with childbirth) was about 14 per 100,000. Only at 21 weeks or later did abortion mortal-
ity reach 14 per 100,000 procedures. During the 16 to 20 week interval, abortion mortality was about
12 per 100,000 procedures, higher than the reported maternal mortality rate but lower than the
estimated rate. C. TirxzE, INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD REVIEW 1983 92 figure 14 (5th ed.
1983). See also Smith, Hughes, Pekow & Rochat, An Assessment of the Incidence of Maternal Mor-
tality in the United States, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 780 (1984) (actual maternal mortality rate for
1974-78 was 20-30 percent higher than reported rate). Between 1977 and 1981, the mortality rate
for abortions performed between weeks 16 and 20 was 7.8 per 100,000 and was 3.6 per 100,000 for
abortions performed at or beyond week 21. Center for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance 1981,
40 table 19A. Both figures are lower than the reported maternal mortality rate for 1981, which was
8.5 deaths per 100,000. National Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Ser-
vices, Advance Report of Final Mortality Statistics, 1982, 33 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REP.
No. 9, supplement at 6 (Dec. 20, 1984).
10. 462 U.S. at 429 n.11.
11. The Court gave as a revised justification for retaining the division at approximately week 12
the fact that second trimester abortions remain more dangerous than first. Id.
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confronted a municipal requirement that all second trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital-a requirement that was not considered medically
necessary by professional medical standards until after week 16.12 Given
that the Court had retained the week 12 dividing line, could it then bifur-
cate the second trimester for purposes of analyzing this regulation? It
could indeed, according to the majority, which invalidated the regula-
tion.13 But this left a nagging and unanswered question: What is the pur-
pose of differentiating between the first and second trimesters if regula-
tions will be scrutinized for conformity with "accepted medical practice"
on a month-to-month or even week-to-week basis? 4
The second pillar of the trimester framework was the time of viability.
In Roe, the Court noted that week 28 was the usual time of viability,
although a fetus could be viable as early as week 24.15 It was not clear in
Roe whether the crucial dividing line was the time period men-
tioned-week 28, or maybe 24-or fetal viability, whenever that oc-
curred." Later cases clarified this. The Court identified viability as the
important time, with the explicit recognition that viability could shift over
the years.1 7 Thus medical advancement could relocate the second pillar
but could not deprive it of significance. In predicting a trimester collision,
Justice O'Connor implied that the time of viability was changing dramati-
cally-that fetuses might even become viable in the first trimester in the
not-too-distant future.18 This interpretation of medical advancement is ex-
aggerated: The actual changes have been, and are likely to continue to be,
small ones. Doctors are now likely to view the threshold of viability as 25
or 24 weeks,19 with a very few survivors a bit earlier.2 But the threshold
has nonetheless changed. In one sense, this poses no problem for the Roe
framework; after all, the Court never said that the period after viability
need be of any particular duration." But in a larger sense, these changes
12. Id. at 436-37.
13. Id. at 436-39.
14. Justice O'Connor charged that the majority has "blurred" the "bright line" that formerly
divided the trimesters and was not in fact adhering to the trimester framework. Id. at 455 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
15. 410 U.S. at 160. The Court relied on L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, supra note 6, at 493.
16. The plaintiffs in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth had objected to the challenged statute's
failure to refer to a gestational time period in defining viability. 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976). This objec-
tion was emphatically rejected by the Court. Id. A district court decision, however, had previously
interpreted Roe to mean that a state could not consider a fetus to be viable before week 24. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Beal v. Franklin, 428 U.S. 701 (1976).
17. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64 (viability is crucial time and is medical, not legislative, determina-
tion); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (time of viability left flexible "for anticipated
advancements in medical skill").
18. 462 U.S. at 457 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 112-17.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 118-23.
21. See supra note 8; Wolfe v. Schorering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 635 (W.D. Ky. 1974), affd 541
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are eroding the Roe foundation, warning us that more dramatic changes
have the potential to erode the abortion right itself.
One question these medical advances raise concerns the remaining rele-
vance, if any, of the respective mortality rates of abortion and childbirth.
In Akron, the Court retained the first trimester/second trimester division
at approximately week 12, thereby dismissing these mortality rates for
purposes of distinguishing the first trimester from the second. The Court
further stated, however, that, if a state tried to prohibit abortion based on
maternal health concerns, the respective mortality rates of abortion and
childbirth would still be relevant.22 The question this raises is whether
states could still prohibit abortion to protect potential life if abortion be-
comes safer than childbirth past the point of fetal viability.23 In other
words, if the trimesters truly collide, such that the fetus is viable but abor-
tion at that time is safer for the woman than childbirth, could states
subordinate their compelling interest in maternal health to their likewise
compelling interest in potential life, thus forcing women to run the in-
creased risk of childbirth for the sake of the fetus? This collision might
give the Court the new task of establishing a lexical ordering of compel-
ling interests for this "impossible" time period.
Another problem (or advantage, depending upon one's perspective)
presented by the effects of medical advances on the trimester system is that
as viability moves earlier in gestation, the time during which women can
choose to abort may become substantially shorter than it was in 1973.
Because abortions following the detection of fetal defects through amni-
ocentesis often cannot be performed until week 20 or 21,24 the freedom to
have these abortions could be threatened,25 as could abortions for those
young teenagers most likely to delay seeking medical care.26 Even the fun-
damental principle for which Roe stands-that women have a constitu-
tional right to choose to abort for a significant portion of preg-
F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (rejecting contention that Roe Court divided pregnancy into three equal,
three-month segments and stating: "A close inspection of the language in the Roe decision reveals that
the Court spoke only of a single trimester, the first. The Court used no language to indicate that the
stages of pregnancy, divided by points of compelling state interests, were evenly divided.").
22. 462 U.S. at 429 n.11.
23. Given the increasing safety of abortion, this could quite soon become the case. As noted previ-
ously, the mortality rate for abortions performed at or beyond week 21 was 3.6 per 100,000 from
1977-81. See supra note 9. Although under Roe, elective abortions can be prohibited at any given
time after viability (though the state can choose to permit them), if abortion at week 23 is or becomes
less hazardous than childbirth, and the threshold of viability reaches week 23 or 22, then some post-
viability abortions will be safer than childbirth.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 196-202 for a discussion of the time constraints involved in
performing amniocentesis and obtaining the results.
25. A new technique of prenatal diagnosis, chorionic villi biopsy, may soon allow for abortions for
genetic defects much earlier than amniocentesis. See infra text accompanying notes 203-06.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 209-12.
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nancy-ultimately could be undermined if the time of viability someday
does dramatically change.
27
This Article will first analyze the justification for, and utility of, the
first trimester/second trimester division. It will then consider the thornier
problem of the expanding "third trimester" and ask whether we should
allow fetal viability, as commonly understood, to dictate the dimensions of
the abortion right. I will argue that although medical technology is impor-
tant, such technology (upon which viability depends) should not be al-
lowed unilaterally to rule abortion law. The abortion framework in Roe
had, I will suggest, important underpinnings that were not articulated ex-
plicitly-mainly, the assumption that a viable fetus was one that was sub-
stantially developed and had reached "late" gestation, and the ethical pre-
cept that late in gestation a fetus is so like a baby that elective abortion
can be forbidden. If technology enables fetuses to survive ex utero so early
in pregnancy that survivability and "late gestation" diverge, allowing
technological viability to determine abortion law will therefore conflict
with the spirit of the Roe decision. I will argue that if this occurs, the
Court can retain the spirit of Roe by recognizing that: (1) viability as a
normative dividing line in pregnancy represents not merely technological
survivability, but also late gestation; and (2) there is a time in pregnancy
that is simply "too early to be late," such that, despite technological
changes, abortions should not be restricted before this time. Although no
dividing line drawn in the continuum of pregnancy will have the "logical
and biological justification" originally claimed by the Court for its in-
creasingly troubled trimesters, this does not render the task of drawing
lines an arbitrary one. Consideration of medical factors, social realities,
and the need for all women to have sufficient time to exercise their consti-
tutional right will suggest a time range beyond which technology should
not control.
I. THE FIRST TRIMESTER/SECOND TRIMESTER DIVISION
The Court in Roe held that the woman's privacy right28 was not abso-
lute, but was to be balanced against state interests that became compelling
at certain points in pregnancy.29 The state interest in maternal health was
27. For a discussion of the potential impact of artificial gestation technology on the abortion right,
see Note, Choice Rights and Abortion: The Begetting Choice Right and State Obstacles to Choice in
Light of Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. CAL L. REv. 877 (1978).
28. This right was initially found to be of constitutional origin in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64. Laws infringing upon fundamental rights are presump-
tively unconstitutional. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980). Once a plaintiff has shown the
requisite degree of interference with a fundamental right, the defendant bears the burden of proving
that the challenged law is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. Planned Parenthood
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held to become compelling at the end of the first trimester, at which point
abortion became more hazardous than childbirth. First trimester abortion
is performed by the relatively safe and simple procedure of dilatation and
curettage, in which the cervix is dilated and the embryo or fetus removed,
most commonly by vacuum aspiration (suction curettage).30 In 1973, the
only second trimester abortion technique available involved infusion of sa-
line into the amniotic sac so as to cause premature labor.31 Because
amnioinfusion cannot be performed until week 16, physicians simply did
not perform abortions between weeks 12 and 16.32 This difference in
abortion procedures and associated mortality rates between the first and
second trimesters created a major medical distinction between the two tri-
mesters at the time of the Roe decision.
A. Was This Division Ever Justified?
In Roe, the Court gave only a sketchy explanation for why a state's
interest in maternal health becomes compelling at the end of the first tri-
mester. It simply stated:
This is so because of the now-established medical fact . . . that until
the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than
mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this
point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that
the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection
of maternal health."3
It seems that a more substantial explanation was necessary, however, be-
cause granting this sort of weight to shifts in mortality statistics was a
highly unusual approach to regulating medical practice.
The federal government and states clearly do have an interest in the
health of their citizens." This interest motivates significant regulation
of, for example, environmental practices, 5 the pharmaceutical indus
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 76-79; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195 (1973).
30. See J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, supra note 4, at 478-80.
31. See R. BOLOGNESE & S. CORSON, INTERRUPTION OF PREGNANCY-A TOTAL PATIENT AP-
PROACH 126-28 (1975); Kerenyi, Intraamniotic Techniques, in ABORTION AND STERILIZATION:
MEDICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 359, 360 (J. Hodgson ed. 1981).
32. Akron, 462 U.S. at 436. Before week 16 there is not sufficient amniotic fluid to perform
amnioinfusion. R. BOLOGNESE & S. CORSON, supra note 31, at 126.
33. 410 U.S. at 163.
34. See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954) (states have broad powers to
establish standards for purpose of protecting citizens' health); People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson,
302 Ill. 422, 427 (1922) (no governmental objective more important than preservation of public
health). See generally T. CHRISTOFFEL, HEALTH AND THE LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH PRO-
FESSIONALS 61-72 (1982) (discussing state's broad powers to protect public health).
35. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982); Clean
Air Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7403-7642 (1982). See generally T. CHRISTOFFEL, supra note 34, at
Vol. 95: 6392 1986
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try,3" and medical research.37 The medical profession is also subject to
regulation. States license physicians and hospitals," establish require-
ments for hospital construction and funding, 9 and so on. However, states
rely on the medical profession to establish and monitor medical practices
and procedures and to ensure their safety.40 One does not find, for exam-
ple, state regulations prescribing the number of doctors and nurses who
must be present at a tonsillectomy.' 1 Even when hospital requirements are
challenged by physicians or staff, courts generally will not second-guess
hospital boards, preferring to leave questions of staff qualifications and
safety practices to these representatives of the medical profession itself.42
224-36 (discussing environmental regulation as means of protecting public health).
36. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982). See generally
G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, THE RIGHTS OF DOCTORS, NURSES, AND ALLIED HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS 111-28 (1981) (describing complex set of state and federal regulations governing use
and distribution of drugs).
37. For example, every federally funded research project involving human subjects must have a
written protocol approved by an institutional review board (IRB). 45 C.F.R. § 46.101-409 (1984).
38. See G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, supra note 36, at 3 (physicians, nurses and many
allied health professionals must be licensed to practice their professions); R. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN
HOSPITAL LAW 46 (4th ed. 1983) (hospital as institution is subject to regulation by state through
licensure).
39. See R. MILLER, supra note 38, at 48 (approval of integrity of hospital buildings is major part
of hospital licensure).
40. Governing boards of hospitals play a large role in ensuring safety. See, e.g., Khan v. Suburban
Community Hosp., 45 Ohio St. 2d 39, 43-45, 340 N.E.2d 398, 402-03 (1976). This practice has been
described by one commentator as follows:
By tacit agreement, the U.S. approach to guaranteeing quality and competence in the provision
of health services has been a two-level approach-very minimal reliance on licensing and very
considerable reliance on the standards set by voluntary and professional organizations and
institutions.
Ball, Background of Regulation in Health Care, in INSTITTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROL ON
HEALTH CARE: PAPERS OF THE CONFERENCE ON REGULATION IN THE HEALTH INDUSTRY, JANU-
ARY 7-9, 1974, at 17 (1975). In another context, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance
of reliance on physicians: "The mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the busi-
ness of judges." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-08 (1979) (holding that physician and hospital
determination sufficient for commitment of mentally ill child; formal due process hearing not
necessary).
41. The court in Friendship Medical Center v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1152-53
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 997 (1975), contrasted Chicago's treatment of dispensaries,
which are subjected to very minimal regulation, with Chicago's attempt to regulate comprehensively
even first trimester abortions, and relied on this disparity in striking down Chicago's regulations. The
Seventh Circuit was influenced by the fact that the details of medical safety are ordinarily left to
physician discretion. Id.
42. See, e.g., Khan v. Suburban Community Hosp., 45 Ohio St. 2d 39, 43-45, 340 N.E.2d 398,
402-03 (1976) (hospital boards are responsible for hospital's health care standards; court's responsi-
bility is narrow one of assuring that qualifications imposed by Board on staff members are reasonably
related to hospital's operation and fairly administered); Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde
Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971) (court should not substitute its evaluation re-
garding staff members for that of Board). According to one authority:
Challenges to hospital rules are almost universally unsuccessful in the courts. This is because
the courts have found that hospitals have a duty to provide high quality patient care and will
uphold almost any hospital rule that arguably has as its purpose the protection of the health
and safety of patients, or the improvement of patient care.
G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, supra note 36, at 16.
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In Doe v. Bolton, the Court noted that no medical procedure other than
abortion was made subject to committee approval or two doctor concur-
rence as a matter of state law,43 and held the restrictions to be unconstitu-
tional, reaffirming the traditional reliance upon the medical profession to
assure patient safety.44 Hence, the imposition of significant state regula-
tion to protect maternal health was itself somewhat unusual.
More importantly, medical mortality rates ordinarily do not determine
the degree of a state's interest in a patient's health.
45 This interest is al-
ways present and legitimate. But in no other context has the Court as-
serted that a shift in mortality rates, without more, transforms the state's
interest in an individual's health from uncompelling to compelling,
thereby justifying greater than usual regulation of the medical profession.
To see how inappropriate according such import to mortality rates would
be in the context of other medical procedures, let us suppose that the mor-
tality rate for radical mastectomies is lower than that for simple mastecto-
mies or "lumpectomies." This fact alone would not be likely to alter pa-
tients' rights to choose among types of breast cancer treatment. Nor would
it give states a justification for imposing additional safety regulations that
would make procedures other than radical mastectomy more difficult to
obtain. As long as the alternatives being offered are accepted medical
practices, it is the function of the medical profession to ascertain their
safety, efficacy, etc. and to convey this risk/benefit information to the pa-
tient.4 It is the patient, in consultation with her physician, who chooses
among accepted forms of treatment. If abortion, prior to the time that the
state's interest in potential life becomes compelling, is to be treated at least
substantially like other medical procedures,
4
7 then the greater risk in-
43. 410 U.S. 179, 197, 199 (1973).
44. Id. at 200.
45. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 30 (1973) (throughout pregnancy, state interest
in maternal health justifies some regulation; fact that childbirth is more dangerous than first trimester
abortion "obviously does not warrant the Court's conclusion that state controls over first trimester
abortion procedures must be [particularly] limited . . . ."); see also Note, Technological Advances
and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. REv. 1194, 1199 n.41 (1982)
(Court gave no reason why mortality rates of abortion versus childbirth should matter; noted that
analogously, although open heart surgery may be safer for particular patient than foregoing surgery,
state has interest in ensuring that operation is performed as safely as possible).
46. Governmental treatment of medical practices is in stark contrast to the much greater degree of
regulation of new drugs. See G. ANNAS, L. GI.ANTz & B. KATz, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION: THE SuBjECT's DILEMMA 222 (1977) ("Before a new drug is put on the market,
the manufacturer is required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Food and Drug Administration
that it is both safe and effective. If one wishes to experiment with a new surgical technique, however,
no prior approval of any governmental or professional agency is generally needed before its use is
promoted.").
47. Abortion need not be treated exactly the same as other medical procedures. See Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (prior written consent requirement for abortion constitu-
tional even though similar requirement not imposed upon any other medical procedures). For further
Vol. 95: 639, 1986
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volved in second trimester terminations should not be viewed as trans-
forming the state's interest in the woman's health from uncompelling to
compelling.
The holding in Akron that the shift in mortality rates was sufficient to
alter the state's degree of interest in the woman's health reflected, I be-
lieve, a conceptual confusion between a change in the state's interest itself
and a change in the sorts of safety practices that are warranted to protect
its interest. States do have an interest in women's health throughout preg-
nancy."' The increasing danger of later abortions clearly warrants physi-
cians' taking greater medical precautions. But just as we would not think
that doctors have a greater interest in the health of a patient undergoing a
more dangerous operation, such as open heart surgery, than in one having
a hysterectomy, the fact that late abortions are more hazardous than ear-
lier ones or than childbirth is inadequate to alter a state's quantum of
interest in the health of a patient undergoing a late abortion. More haz-
ardous procedures warrant more stringent safeguards, but it would take
much more argument to show that the state's interest itself, and not
merely the appropriate level of precautions, had been transformed.49
Perhaps the Court believed that its holding in Roe would appear more
legitimate if abortion, even when permitted, was distinguished from other
medical procedures. Or perhaps it believed that a heavy emphasis on the
medical components of the abortion issue would increase public accept-
ance of its decisions.5  It is understandable that the Court held that the
interest in maternal health became compelling at a particular time in
pregnancy, inasmuch as this rationale (1) reflected the increasing dangers
of later abortions; (2) resulted in a satisfying symmetry with the holding
that the interest in potential life becomes compelling at viability; and (3)
coincided with the widely held belief that very early abortions are the
discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 175-76.
48. See 462 U.S. at 459-61 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49. This general type of confusion is illustrated in cases involving termination of treatment.
Courts often imply that a patient's right to privacy (so as to avoid treatment) increases as his or her
prognosis dims. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742,
370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976). But as has been pointed out by many of the Commissioners and staff of the former
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, the privacy right does not
fluctuate. Rather, medical prognosis simply influences the sorts of actions that are medically and
ethically justifiable. Brief and Appendix for Amicus Curiae, Commissioners and Professional Staff of
the Recent President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research at 12, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
50. As Laurence Tribe suggests:
Perhaps the Court simply believed that the public acceptability of its result would be enhanced
if it couched the abortion holding in medical rather than ethical terms. Or perhaps the lan-
guage chosen reflects little beyond the medical interests and associations of particular Justices.
In no event does the medical terminology alter the substantive result.
Tribe, supra note 45, at 38 n.168.
The Yale Law Journal
most justifiable, very late ones the least, and mid-pregnancy ones some-
where in between. 51 But the continuum of pregnancy contains no magic
moment at which the maternal health interest becomes compelling, and
the Court's implying that it does created unnecessary problems. The
knowledge that after week 12 a compelling state interest will be presumed
may have tempted anti-abortion legislatures to impose unnecessarily strict
second trimester regulations in the name of health.
5" This presumption
has also obscured the fact that what the state should be required to prove
is simply that it has a compelling interest (the only available candidate
being maternal health) in the particular regulation. In other words, all
presumptions aside, before the time that states can protect fetal life, a state
should have to prove that a challenged abortion regulation is necessary to
promote women's health. If abortion before this time is to be treated es-
sentially like any other medical procedure, a presumption that increases or
decreases this burden at a particular date seems both unnecessary and
unjustified.
B. Technology and the Erosion of the Division's Function
Even though the Court in Roe failed to provide an adequate justifica-
tion for the line it drew at approximately week 12, it appeared nonethe-
less to have set up a workable system for judicial scrutiny of abortion
regulation. By the early 1980's, however, both technological advances and
other Supreme Court decisions were raising additional questions about the
meaning and continued validity of the first trimester/second trimester di-
vision. These new threats to the logic of the Roe schema came to a head in
the Akron case.
Among the numerous provisions of Akron's abortion law challenged by
plaintiffs was one that required that all second trimester abortions be per-
formed in a hospital. Although many provisions of Akron's ordinance
were thinly disguised attempts to chill the abortion right,
53 this provision
was of a somewhat different character. It presumably would have been
constitutional in the mid-1970's, when both the American Public Health
Association (APHA) and the American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
51. For surveys illustrating the strength of public belief on this issue, and for a brief description of
attempts to establish its ethical foundations and justifications, see infra notes 160-66 and accompany-
ing text.
52. See, e.g., the consent requirements in the Akron statute, which required the physician to in-
form the woman "[t]hat the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception" and to
describe in detail its physiological characteristics, including its "appearance, mobility, tactile sensitiv-
ity, including pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, the presence of internal organs
and the presence of external members." 462 U.S. at 423 n.5 (citing Akron Codified Ordinances, 
ch.
1870, § 1870.06 (B)(3)).
53. See supra note 52.
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necologists (ACOG) recommended hospitalization for all second trimester
procedures. But by the time of the Akron case, both second trimester pro-
cedures and safety rates had changed considerably. Doctors had begun to
use a new second trimester procedure, dilatation and evacuation (D & E),
in which the cervix is dilated and large forceps are used to remove the
fetus.5 Second trimester abortions no longer had to be postponed until
week 16, when amnioinfusion could be performed, because D & E can be
performed between weeks 12 and 16."' Thus, by the late 1970's abortion
was safer than childbirth through week 16.56 Moreover, by the early
1980's, the APHA and AGOG no longer recommended hospitalization for
abortions done before 16 weeks.5 7 Hence the problem with Akron's ordi-
nance was that it was medically out of date and unnecessarily restrictive
for the first four weeks of the second trimester.
The Supreme Court invalidated Akron's in-hospital requirement, hold-
ing that by imposing stricter safety requirements upon early second tri-
mester abortions than were medically necessary, Akron impermissibly in-
fringed upon the abortion right.5 In the course of analyzing this
regulation, however, the Court had to face several troubling questions
about the trimester schema. The first was the impact of the change in
mortality rates, i.e., that abortion was now safer than childbirth through
approximately week 16. In recognition of this, several lower courts had
held that the state's interest in maternal health no longer became compel-
ling at week 12, but instead at a later time,5 while other courts had ad-
hered to the original dividing line.60 The Court forthrightly faced the
54. See Grimes & Cates, Dilatation and Evacuation, in SECOND TRIMESTER ABORTION 119,
128-31 (G. Berger ed. 1981) (discussing safety of D & E procedure).
55. Akron, 462 U.S. at 436.
56. Id. at 429 n.1 1, relying on LeBolt, Grimes & Gates, Mortality from Abortion and Childbirth:
Are the Populations Comparable?, 248 J. A.M.A. 188, 191 (1982) (abortion safer than childbirth upto gestational age of 16 weeks). In fact, prior to 16 weeks abortions are seven times safer than contin-
uing the pregnancy to term. Gates & Grimes, Morbidity and Mortality of Abortion in the United
States, in ABORTION AND STERILIZATION: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 155, 170-71 (J. Hodgson
ed. 1981). Statistics now show that D & E is the safest and most common method of abortion evenduring the 16-20 week interval. See Center for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Preliminary
Analysis, 1979-1980-United States, 32 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 63, 64
(1983); Cates, Schulz, Grimes, Horowitz, Lyon, Kravitz & Frisch, Dilatation and Evacuation Proce-dures and Second-Trimester Abortions, 248 J. A.M.A. 559, 560 (1982). As noted previously, today
abortions are safer than childbirth even past week 16. See supra note 9.
57. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 436-37.
58. Id. at 437.
59. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Stumbo, 519 F. Supp. 22, 26 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (as new medical techniquesevolve, trimester limitations may not always be controlling); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp.
181, 194-96 (E.D. La. 1980) (because abortion safer than childbirth through week 18, state cannot
regulate until then).
60. See Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Servs. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894, 899 (N.D. Ind.1980), affd sub nom. Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981) (under
Roe, courts cannot subdivide a trimester for purposes of constitutional scrutiny).
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question of whether the state's interest in maternal health should now
become compelling a month later:
Roe identified the end of the first trimester as the compelling point
because until that time-according to the medical literature available
in 1973-'mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal
childbirth.' There is substantial evidence that developments in the
past decade, particularly the development of a much safer method for
performing second-trimester abortions . . . have extended the period
in which abortions are safer than childbirth."'
But the Court dismissed this problem rather peremptorily, noting that sec-
ond trimester procedures will likely remain more hazardous and traumatic
than earlier ones, and stated:
We think it prudent, however, to retain Roe's identification of the
beginning of the second trimester as the approximate time at which
the State's interest in maternal health becomes sufficiently compel-
ling to justify significant regulation of abortion. We note that the
medical evidence suggests that until approximately the end of the
first trimester, the State's interest in maternal health would not be
served by regulations that restrict the manner in which abortions are
performed by a licensed physician.2
With this less than compelling reasoning, the Court simply adhered to the
original framework of Roe, concluding that it "continues to provide a rea-
sonable legal framework for limiting a State's authority to regulate
abortions." 3
The Court's retention of the original dividing line demonstrates that
mortality rates are insufficient to transform a state's interest from uncom-
pelling to compelling. If the mortality rates were truly crucial, then the
state interest would change with them. Of course, if mortality rates do not
affect the state's degree of interest, then neither should the fact that late
abortions remain more hazardous than earlier ones. Retention of the week
12 line in spite of the changing medical facts implies that the trimester
schema is more important to the Court than are its purported justifica-
tions. This view is bolstered by the Court's current justification for the
division, which is based primarily on functional grounds-the division
provides a workable framework for abortion scrutiny. A closer look at
61. Akron, 462 U.S. at 429 n.11 (citation omitted).
62. Id. Respective mortality rates would, the Court stated, be relevant only if a state sought to
prohibit abortion based on maternal health concerns. Id.
63. Id.
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Akron will show, however, that even this pragmatic approach has signifi-
cant weaknesses.
The second trimester hospitalization requirement was unusual in that it
was a reasonable safeguard for the latter two months of the second trimes-
ter. Hospitalization was medically unnecessary only from week 12 until
about week 16. Thus, the Court's task was unlike the typical scrutiny of
abortion regulations, which, since Roe, had ordinarily been written along
trimester lines,64 and had likewise been scrutinized as they applied to the
trimester as a unit. 5 As Justice O'Connor put it, there had until Akron
been a "bright line" dividing the trimesters, a line which the Akron mode
of analysis, despite its verbal homage to the trimester system, had now
blurred. 6
In one sense, Justice O'Connor's criticism is simply misplaced: Roe v.
Wade never guaranteed that trimesters were, in every instance, indivisible,
or that a regulation would be constitutional if it was valid for any portion
of the trimester to which it applied. A hypothetical should help illustrate
this. Suppose a state, noting that D & E has become the safest abortion
method through week 20, enacted a statute requiring doctors to perform
all second trimester abortions by D & E. But suppose also that few physi-
cians in that particular state actually used D & E later than week 16.
Such a regulation would be valid from weeks 12 through 16. However, if
a court upheld it based upon the supposed unity of the trimester, it would
effectively eliminate second trimester abortions after week 16. There is no
doubt that, under the strict scrutiny of abortion regulations utilized in Roe
and subsequent cases, such a hypothetical regulation would be invalid as
prohibiting abortions prior to fetal viability.6 7 Trimesters, therefore, need
not always be treated as units.
64. See, e.g., S. C. CODE ANN. § 44-41 (Law. Co-op 1985) (using terminology of first, second,
and third trimesters); IND. CODE ANN. § 3 5 -1-58.5-1(a) (Burns 1979 & Supp. 1984) (pregnancy
divided into three equal parts of three months each); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3201-20 (Purdon
1983) (first trimester and subsequent stages divided by viability); N.D. CEsNT. CODE § 14-02.1-01-12
(1981) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201-08 (1982) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301-325
(1978) (same).
65. For example, in Danforth, the Court invalidated Missouri's prohibition of saline amni-
ocentesis beginning after week 12. 428 U.S. at 75-79. Had the Court subdivided the second trimester
for purposes of constitutional analysis here, it would still have invalidated this requirement. It should
at least have noted, however, that for the first month of the second trimester this prohibition con-
formed with accepted medical practice, because amniocentesis cannot safely be performed prior to
week 16.
66. 462 U.S. at 455 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67. In Danforth, the court invalidated a regulation prohibiting the use of saline for second trimes-
ter abortions, holding that saline was a commonly used method of abortion that was relatively safe. It
also noted that the major alternative, prostaglandin, had not been widely available when the statute
was enacted. 428 U.S. at 77-79. Similarly, in Colautti v. Franklin, the Court invalidated a regulation
requiring the physician, if he or she believed a fetus may be viable, to use the technique safest for the
fetus unless another method was necessary to the woman's health, a regulation that was likewise
thought to prohibit saline amnioinfusion. 439 U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979).
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In another sense, however, Justice O'Connor has a point. If the original
mortality rate justification for the division is gone, and if being valid for
two thirds of the trimester is not enough to legitimize a regulation, what is
the continuing relevance of trimesters? Akron's hospitalization require-
ment was invalidated because, for one month of pregnancy, it did not con-
form with accepted medical practice. Verbiage aside, what does the
Court's analysis have to do with trimesters? For that matter, what pre-
cisely is the difference in constitutional analysis between first trimester
and second trimester regulations?
In Roe v. Wade, the Court said that states could enact no abortion
regulation in the first trimester-that physician and patient must be free
to terminate any pregnancy during that time "without regulation by the
State." 8 But ever since Roe, a variety of first trimester regulations have
gained judicial approval. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, the Court upheld both written informed consent requirements and
record-keeping requirements that were imposed in the first trimester.
69 In
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, it upheld first trimester pathology re-
port requirements."0 Although the Court in Akron invalidated the re-
quirement that physicians themselves perform the abortion counseling, it
noted that a state may require a physician to verify that counseling has
been provided and may establish reasonable minimum requirements for
counselors, with no stated trimester restrictions." Clearly, states can regu-
late even first trimester abortions to at least some extent.
In Akron, the Court sought to clarify the meaning of the 12th week
dividing line by explaining that, in the first trimester, states can regulate
abortion in minor respects but may not restrict it-i.e., states may not
interfere with the physician-patient consultation or the woman's choice
between abortion and childbirth." In the second trimester, however, states
can enact "significant" (i.e., somewhat restrictive) abortion 
regulations, 73
as long as the restriction is legitimately related to the maternal health
object the state seeks to accomplish. 4 Examples of permissible subjects for
second trimester regulations include:
[R]equirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to per-
form the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility
in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must
68. 410 U.S. at 163.
69. 428 U.S. at 65-67.
70. 462 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1983).
71. 462 U.S. at 448-49.
72. Id. at 430.
73. Id. at 429 n.11.
74. Id. at 430-31.
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be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-
hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.75
The Court further explained that medical evidence suggests that until the
end of the first trimester, the state's interest in health would not be served
by regulations that restrict the manner in which abortions are performed
by a licensed physician."8
Although this "significant/insignificant" formulation initially sounds
plausible, the Court has already upheld first trimester regulations on most
of the topics that it described as appropriate for second trimester regula-
tion. States have always been allowed to require that only licensed physi-
cians perform abortions, no matter what trimester it is. They can also
specify, to some extent, where abortions can be performed: Although med-
ically unnecessary hospitalization cannot be required, first trimester abor-
tions in private homes can unquestionably be proscribed. In fact, a section
of Akron's ordinance that was presumed constitutional required that first
trimester abortions be performed in "a hospital or an abortion facility.""7
Even if a first trimester regulation dealt with abortion methods, it would
probably not be found invalid if it conformed with medical practice, e.g.,
if it simply stated that first trimester abortions should be performed by
suction curettage or another medically approved method. 8 Redundant,
yes, but probably not invalid.79 Thus, trying to distinguish "significant"
regulations from "insignificant" ones by topic is wholly unworkable.
Another way of seeking to describe a difference in judicial approach to
first and second trimester regulations is as follows: In the first trimester, a
regulation that has any impact on the abortion right will be strictly scruti-
nized and upheld only if it has a minimal effect (e.g., general informed
consent or record keeping requirements) and if the state proves that it
furthers important health concerns.80 In the second trimester, strict scru-
tiny still applies, but because the state is now presumed to have a compel-
ling interest, a regulation that is neither vague, overly broad nor unneces-
sarily burdensome, and that furthers the state's health interest, will be
75. Id. at 431 n.14.
76. Id. at 429 n.11.
77. Id. at 432 n.17.
78. Suction curettage is a standard first trimester abortion method. See J. PRITCHARD, P. MAC-
DONALD & N. GANT, supra note 4, at 478-80 (1985).
79. Justice O'Connor makes this same point in her dissent in Akron. She notes that standards of
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists provide that physicians performing first tri-
mester abortions in their offices should have certain types of equipment available and should have
provisions for emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of complications. She states: "I have
no doubt that the State has a compelling interest to ensure that these or other requirements are met,
and that this legitimate concern would justify state regulation for health reasons even in the first
trimester of pregnancy." Id. at 460 n.7 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
80. Akron, 462 U.S. at 428-30.
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upheld.8' This description, it might be argued, shows that there is indeed
a real difference between the trimesters under Roe. The impact of first
trimester regulations must be minimal, while the impact of second trimes-
ter ones can be greater than minimal as long as they are not unnecessarily
burdensome.
Although this distinction has a ring of verbal clarity to it, close analysis
reveals it to be more apparent than real, at least insofar as it is meant to
suggest that there is some difference in approach to first and second tri-
mester regulations and not merely to reflect the fact that the different
abortion methods used in the second trimester render some precautions
appropriate that would be unnecessary earlier on. The Court in Akron
said that first trimester regulations may not interfere with the physician-
patient consultation or with the woman's choice between abortion and
childbirth. But surely second trimester ones cannot interfere with these
important interests either. Indeed, by analyzing the medical need for hos-
pitalization at different times throughout the second trimester, and by re-
quiring that second trimester regulations conform to accepted medical
practice, the Court in Akron substantially undermined its claim that the
trimester division is a useful and functional one. A regulation that con-
forms with medical practice does not restrict, in any meaningful sense, the
abortion right. Rather, such a regulation seems to have no more than a
minimal impact on that right. Indeed, this "conformity with medical prac-
tice" requirement has rendered the standard for second trimester regula-
tions virtually identical to that used for first trimester ones: Regulations
that restrict abortions are permissible only if they ensure the existence of
the medical standards that underlie the finding in Roe regarding the safety
of first trimester abortions. 2 Thus, verbal protestations to the contrary,
the Court's analysis of second trimester regulations is becoming indistin-
guishable from its analysis of first trimester ones.
To the extent that any difference remains between the first and second
trimesters under the Court's analytical schema, it is probably that the
state has a greater evidentiary burden in proving medical necessity for
first trimester regulations than for second. Presuming first trimester regu-
lations invalid, but allowing greater leeway for legitimate maternal pro-
tection in the second trimester, may have seemed a reasonable way to
avoid scrutinizing the legislative motive behind innumerable state statutes.
But in 1973, the Court probably did not expect that abortion would re-
main such a passionately contested issue or that anti-abortion legislatures
81. Id. at 430-31.
82. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975). See Comment, City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc., 22 DuQ. L. REv. 767, 779 (1984) (noting that although purporting to
retain trimester framework, Akron decision significantly modified it).
Vol. 95: 639, 1986
Trimesters and Technology
would show such unflagging zeal in enacting complex and restrictive
abortion regulations. This legislative activity has required the Court to
scrutinize all aspects, including motive and medical necessity, of even sec-
ond trimester regulations. Evidentiary burdens and trimester divisions
play a modest role in these examinations, with the crucial aspect being a
thorough evaluation of the regulation's medical justification. Given this
reality, the Court should openly discard the presumption of a compelling
state interest and simply hold that before viability, states must demon-
strate a compelling interest in the challenged regulation-i.e., that it is
necessary to ensure the woman's safety-and that the regulation conforms
with accepted medical practice. 8
In summary, the state's degree of interest in the health of abortion pa-
tients does not fluctuate: It is instead the level of appropriate precautions
that changes. But as the analysis of Akron's hospitalization requirement
shows, changes in the necessity for precautions need not correspond to the
trimester division. Although adhering verbally to the first trimester/second
trimester division, the Court today is very close to simply requiring that
the state prove that any pre-viability regulation is necessary to preserve
women's health. Many needless complexities would be eliminated if the
Court would adopt this unified standard and forthrightly relinquish its
verbal adherence to the unjustified and illusory trimester division.
II. THE SECOND TRIMESTER/THIRD TRIMESTER DIVISION
According to the Court in Roe, fetal viability marks the stage after
which states can prohibit abortions (unless the woman's health is
threatened). 84 Relying on medical technology in 1973, the Court noted
that fetuses ordinarily became viable at around 28 weeks, but can some-
times achieve viability as early as week 24.85 In noting these specific
times, however, the Court did not intend to imply that they had signifi-
cance independent of current medical knowledge and technology. Some
lower courts thought that the Roe Court did intend to hold that, for pur-
poses of the law, trimesters were necessarily of a fixed duration,86 as did
83. The knowledge that second trimester regulations will be scrutinized as strictly as first trimes-
ter ones might help discourage states and municipalities from enacting excessively restrictive abortion
regulations. But even if my suggestion that the first and second trimesters be scrutinized equally
strictly is not accepted, the Court's emphasis on conformity with accepted medical practice should
itself be useful in discouraging excessive regulation. As one Akron commentator notes,
In light of frequent changes in medical techniques, it may be that laws such as Nebraska's,
which outlaw the performing of an abortion 'by using anything other than accepted medical
procedures . . .' are the only ones which are safe from constitutional invalidation.
Comment, supra note 82, at 784 n.111. See NEB. Rav. STAT. § 28-336 (1979).
84. 410 U.S. at 163-65.
85. Id. at 160.
86. See, e.g., Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 192 (D. Utah 1973). "[U]ntil the end of the
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some state legislatures, which deemed fetuses presumptively viable after a
certain number of weeks.87 The Supreme Court made clear in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, however, that viability was a medical determi-
nation and that "it is not the proper function of the legislature or the
courts to place viability . . . at a specific point in the gestation period.""
8
It likewise emphasized in Colautti v. Franklin that the point of viability
must be left flexible "for anticipated advancements in medical skill."
89
Thus, in establishing fetal viability as a dividing line, the Supreme Court
never promised that this division would continue to coincide with the last
third of pregnancy, or that the second and third trimesters (in legal terms)
would necessarily remain of roughly equal lengths.
9"
The line the Court drew at viability (which for convenience will be
called the second trimester/third trimester division) is legally far more
significant than the first trimester/second trimester division. Prior to via-
bility, state regulation can look only to the woman's health. If the state's
true motivation is to protect her health, the regulation should seldom seri-
ously conflict with the woman's right to choose a common and relatively
safe medical procedure. But after viability, states can promote their now
compelling interest in potential life. 91 This interest is fundamentally at
odds with the woman's right to abort, at least as long as an abortion en-
tails both removing and destroying the fetus.
92 To protect potential life, a
second trimester .. the state's right to regulate the abortion decision . . . is limited to regulations
reasonably related to maternal health. . . .After the second trimester. . . at the stage of viability of
the fetus, the state may regulate the abortion decision for the purpose of protecting the fetus. .. .
See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Beal v. Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) (incorrectly interpreting Roe to have
held that state could not consider any fetus to be viable before 24th week of pregnancy).
87. See Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1016 (D. Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed for
want of jurisdiction sub nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975), afl'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976) (invalidating statute stating fetus
shall be considered potentially viable at 20 weeks). Some such statutes remain on the books. See, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFEry CODE § 25953 (West 1984) (retaining 1967 statute prohibiting abortion
after week 20); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(1) (Law. Co-op 1985) (creating legal presumption that
viability occurs no earlier than 24 weeks).
88. 428 U.S. at 64.
89. 439 U.S. at 387.
90. Although it divided pregnancy into three stages, the Court spoke of only one trimester-the
first. See Survey of Abortion Law, supra note 8, at 141. But because state legislatures, reasonably
enough, enacted regulations that spoke in terms of trimesters, the Court, in subsequent cases such as
Akron, has referred to the "second trimester." 462 U.S. at 434-39.
91. It is clear that regulation to protect potential life is appropriate only after viability. In Co-
lautti, the Supreme Court held void for vagueness a regulation that required the physician to use the
abortion technique which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so long
as a different technique would not be necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. 439 U.S.
at 389. Because the statute required this when the physician either determined the fetus to be viable
or when there was "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable," the Court found it
unclear whether the phrase "may be viable" referred to an undefined gray area prior to viability. Id.
at 379. If it did, the statute would impose an inappropriate requirement upon the physician.
92. The only circumstance under which protection of fetal life and the woman's right to choose
would not conflict with each other is if a fetus could be removed without harming it in a manner that
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state can regulate post-viability abortions up to the point of prohibiting
them entirely, unless the woman's health is threatened.9" Moreover, post-
viability regulations need not conform with accepted medical practice, as
illustrated by the Court's treatment in Planned Parenthood Association
v. Ashcroft94 of a requirement that a second physician be present at all
post-viability abortions in order to protect any fetus unexpectedly born
alive.95 This requirement was not standard medical practice, but it was
nonetheless held constitutional.96
While clearly granted great legal significance, the line drawn at viabil-
ity has certain peculiar features. It is a legal standard that is defined en-
tirely by medical professionals and that varies with advances in medical
technology. Although viability is merely a medical or technological fact
(or, more accurately, a statistical prediction) the Court relies on this fact
alone as the basis for the value judgment that the state's interest in the
fetus is now compelling. These peculiarities render the viability standard
suspicious, for they suggest that control over the dimensions of a constitu-
tional right has been wholly delegated to medical technology and the phy-
sicians who develop, utilize and assess this technology. As one critic has
put it, under the Roe analysis the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists holds a "continuing constitutional convention."'97 These un-
was safe for the woman. See, e.g., Favole, Artificial Gestation: New Meaning for the Right to Termi-
nate Pregnancy, 21 AMsz. L. REv. 755, 766-67 (1979) (suggesting that if artificial gestation were
possible from week 12 on, a method of pregnancy termination after that time that did not involve
feticide would protect both woman's privacy right and state's interest in potential life). Although it
could be argued that the woman's privacy right entails a right to feticide, this argument would face
strong opposition. See id. at 766; see also Bok, Ethical Problems of Abortion, 2 HASTINGS CENTER
STUDIES 33, 35 (1974) (if non-harmful severance of fetus and mother is feasible, it would be wrong to
insist on technique that kills fetus and prevents others from assuming burden of its care).
93. The Court has emphasized that doctors cannot be required to make "trade-offs" between the
woman's health and the life of the fetus. See, e.g., Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400-01 (holding void for
vagueness post-viability requirement that physician use least feticidal technique unless alternative was
necessary to preserve woman's health and noting lack of clarity as to whether such "trade-offs" were
required under statute).
94. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
95. Id. at 485-86. Under Missouri law, post-viability abortions were allowed only to protect the
woman's life or health. The plaintiffs argued that the second-physician requirement distorted the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, was impracticable and costly, and that the state did not require
a second physician to be present for any other medical procedure, including childbirth and premature
delivery. Id. at 483-85.
96. Id. at 485-86. According to the Court, although preserving the life of a viable fetus that is
aborted may seldom be possible, "the State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur." Id. at 486. A strong dissent by Justices Black-
mun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens would have invalidated this requirement as well, on the grounds
that it is at least possible that for some post-viability abortions, D & E, which never results in a live
birth, would be the method safest for the woman. In such cases, the second physician requirement
would be futile and overbroad, and consequently not tailored to the state's legitimate interests. The
dissent would require post-viability regulations, like earlier ones, to have at least some reasonable
medical basis. Id. at 499-501.
97. Wilkins, State Legislative Authority and the Continuing Constitutional Convention of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists I (May 28, 1985) (unpublished paper presented
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usual features of the viability standard likewise imply that although tech-
nology could conceivably develop in such a way that the abortion right
would be greatly circumscribed, avoiding such an outcome is out of the
Court's control. Because it is highly unusual for the law to allow another
discipline such control over a legal standard,98 or to imply that a techno-
logical fact is imbued with inherent value, close scrutiny of the meaning
and relevance of the viability standard is warranted.
I will begin my scrutiny of viability by briefly describing the well-
known practical difficulties with the viability standard. I will then cri-
tique the Court's suggestion, in Roe, that viability has "logical and biolog-
ical justifications," and conclude that there is neither logical nor biological
significance in the fact that a fetus could potentially survive with the aid
of massive high-technology support. The critique of the viability standard
is complex, however, because in 1973 it was virtually inconceivable that a
viable fetus would be anything other than one that was substantially de-
veloped and had survived to the last stage of pregnancy. I will argue that
the concept of late gestation, with the accompanying moral, emotional,
and social implication that the fetus has become substantially similar to a
baby, was a necessary, albeit unarticulated, component of the Roe viability
standard. The legal concept of viability, in other words, has not only a
technological definition but a significant symbolic meaning. Only now are
we taking seriously the possibility that medical advances could someday
deprive viability of this symbolic meaning, thereby undermining the very
foundation of Roe. But this threat is easily addressed. Retaining the right
recognized in Roe requires nothing more than making explicit the multi-
ple meanings implicit in the viability standard.
A. The Relevance of Viability
1. Practical Difficulties with the Division
Using viability as the point after which prohibition of abortion is per-
missible presents well-known practical difficulties. First, viability is very
hard to assess in utero.99 The most important determinant of viability of a
newborn is the capacity for some degree of pulmonary function.
100 Lung
function, however, cannot be ascertained in utero. Analyses of survival
at the American Association for the Advancement of Sciences Annual Convention, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia) (on file with author).
98. For a brief discussion of the way the law ordinarily retains control and refuses to allow the
determinations of other disciplines to preempt legal analysis, see infra Part IV.
99. Numerous commentators have remarked upon the difficulty of estimating viability in utero.
See, e.g., King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77
MIcH. L. REv. 1647, 1678 (1979); Survey of Abortion Law, supra note 8, at 130-33.
100. See Survey of Abortion Law, supra note 8, at 130-31.
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rates for premature babies, which at their lowest extreme indicate the
threshold of viability, most commonly rest on birthweight, °1 a factor that
correlates highly with fetal lung development. But fetal weight likewise
cannot be accurately determined in utero.' 2 Birthweight, however, also
correlates with gestational age. 03 Physicians therefore use gestational age
to assess viability in utero.1 4
Estimates of gestational age today are far more precise than they were
in the past, when doctors had to rely solely upon the woman's estimate in
conjunction with a physical examination. Ultrasonography now allows
physicians to measure the biparietal diameter (BPD) of the fetus' head
and compare the measurement with charts that correlate BPD in nor-
mally developing fetuses with their gestational age. 5 This method,
though quite accurate early in pregnancy, 06 becomes somewhat less accu-
rate later on, so that after about 20 weeks an estimate may be inaccurate
by plus or minus ten days or even two weeks.10 7 Thus a competent physi-
cian could estimate the fetal gestational age to be 22 weeks when it was
really almost 24. Moreover, estimates of gestational age can be incorrect
by a much wider margin if the fetus is microcephalic (i.e., has an unusu-
ally small head) or growth-retarded. 0 8
A second difficulty arises from the fact that assessment of viability in
101. See Yu, Orgill, Bajuk & Astbury, Survival and 2-Year Outcome of Extremely Preterm In-
fants, 91 BRIT. J. OBsrrRIcs & GYNECOLOGY 640, 640 (1984).
102. See id. at 640, stating that:
The use of birthweight as a framework for the presentation of survival and late morbidity data
is a convenient system for the neonatologist who has an accurate measurement on which to
base his analysis. However, gestation, not birthweight, is the parameter that must be used by
the obstetrician to guide him in making critical decisions on the management of the mother and
fetus.
103. See Lubchenco, Hansman, Dressler & Boyd, Intrauterine Growth as Estimated from Live
Born Birth-Weight Data at 24 to 42 Weeks of Gestation, 32 PEDIATRICS 793 (1963); J. PRITCHARD,
P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, supra note 4, at 746-47 figure 37-1.
104. Other factors, however, are relevant. In Colautti, the Court noted that in assessing the via-
bility of a fetus, doctors will rely on various factors, including the woman's menstrual history, the size
of the uterus, the woman's general health and nutrition, etc. 439 U.S. at 395-96. The Court noted
that the imprecision of these factors made accurate prediction difficult. Id. at 396.
105. See G. AVERY, NEONATOLOGY: PATHOPHYSIOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NEW-
BORN 108 (2d ed. 1981); Stubblefield, Abortion vs. Manslaughter, 110 ARCHIVES SURGERY 790
(1975).
106. According to one authority, up to the 20th week, this method is accurate by a factor of plus
or minus three days. G. AVERY, supra note 105, at 108.
107. Stubblefield, supra note 105, at 791; Grimes, Second-Trimester Abortions in the United
States, 16 FAMILY PLANNING PERSpS. 260, 264 (1984) (from weeks 16-26, ultrasound can determine
gestation age with accuracy of plus or minus 11 days in 95% of cases).
108. Because the charts used for correlations are based on measurements of normally developing
fetuses, fetuses whose development is abnormal may deviate much more from such predictions. Stub-
blefield, supra note 105; Grimes, supra note 107; see J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD, & N. GANr,
supra note 4, at 746 (although in normal pregnancies there is a strong correlation between fetal age
and size, correlation becomes much weaker when infant is large or small (growth-retarded) for gesta-
tional age). Poor maternal nutrition plays an important causative role in abnormally slow fetal devel-
opment. See Survey of Abortion Law, supra note 8, at 132.
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utero is simply the prediction that a particular fetus may survive because
infants of its gestational age have previously done so. But what percentage
of infants of its age must have survived to make the fetus viable? Should a
5 or 10 percent chance suffice, or should 30 to 50 percent be required?
Physicians' failure to agree on this issue' 09 seriously complicates their esti-
mates of fetal viability.
Finally, even if doctors did agree about what chance of survival makes a
fetus viable, the chances inevitably vary as medical technology advances.
The medical textbook the Supreme Court relied on in Roe v. Wade listed
the general limit of viability as 28 weeks and 1000 grams."10 Today, how-
ever, infants weighing more than 1000 grams (the mean weight at 28
weeks), almost routinely survive,"' and the survival rate for infants born
between 750 and 1000 grams is reportedly around 50 percent." 2 The
mean birth weight at 25 weeks is 750 grams, though birth weights of
infants of similar gestational ages can vary significantly." 3 Although few
infants of between 500 and 750 grams in the past have lived, an increas-
ing number of babies even this small are surviving. Some very recent stud-
ies have reported survival rates for such infants of up to 42 percent ."
4
More studies focus on weight than gestational age, making it possible that
some extremely low birth weight survivors are small for gestational age
(i.e., the fetuses might be more advanced in terms of weeks than their
109. One physician may consider an infant not viable unless its chances of survival are 50 percent,
while another may believe that a 30, or 20, or even 10 percent chance will suffice. But see King,
supra note 99, at 1679-87 (proposing moving official time of viability if one infant has survived at
gestational age). See also Fost, Chudwin & WikIer, The Limited Moral Significance of 'Fetal Viabil-
ity,' HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1980, at 10. (discussing various types of ambiguity in concept of
viability); King, supra note 99, at 1678 (noting the "extraordinary complexity of determining a par-
ticular fetus' viability").
110. See L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, supra note 6, at 493. At that time, approximately 50
percent of infants of this age and weight survived. See Favole, supra note 92, at 765 n.73; King,
supra note 99, at 1679. In Colautti, the Court referred to viability as the "reasonable likelihood...
[of] survival." 439 U.S. at 388.
111. Mortality rates for infants weighing between 1001 and 1500 grams fell from greater than 50
percent in the 1960's to less than 20 percent in the 1970's. P. BUDETTI, P. MCMANUS, N. BARRAND
& L. HEINEN, THE COSTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE 30 (U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment, The Implications of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Medical Technology,
Background Paper #2; Case Studies of Medical Technologies, Case Study #10, Aug. 1981).
112. See Ross, Mortality and Morbidity in Very Low Birthweight Infants, 12 PEDIATRIC ANNALS
32, 37 (1983) (listing survival statistics from various centers).
113. The 90th percentile of birth weight at 25 weeks is slightly over 1000 grams, and the 10th
percentile is just below 500 grams. Goldenberg, Nelson, Hale, Wayne, Bartolucci & Koski, Survival
of Infants with Low Birth Weight and Early Gestational Age, 149 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL-
oay 508, 509 figure 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Goldenberg]. See also J. PRITCHARD, P. MAC-
DONALD, & N. GANT, supra note 4, at 746 figure 37-1 (chart gives slightly higher weights than
Goldenberg chart). Fetal weight from different charts may vary because such factors as race and
socioeconomic status affect birth weight. See id. at 926; G. AVERY, supra note 105, at 206-07.
114. Hirata, Epcar, Walsh, Mednick, Harris, McGinnis, Sehring & Papedo, Survival and Out-
come of Infants 501 to 750 gra: A Six-Year Experience, 102 J. PEDIATRICS 741 (1983) (survival rate
of 36%); Orgill, Astbury, Bajuk & Yu, Early Development of Infants 1000 g or Less at Birth, 57
ARCHIVES DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 823, 825 (1982) (survival rate of 42%).
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weight would otherwise suggest)." 5 However, in one recent study that did
focus upon age, 29 percent of infants born at 25 weeks survived. 16
The current threshold of viability is usually estimated at about 24
weeks, 7 with survival before this time exceedingly unlikely. However, a
few infants have survived at 23 weeks, 18 and there is the occasional re-
port of a survival at 22 weeks.1 19 According to at least one expert, the
threshold of viability is now 23 weeks. 2 Outcomes for infants weighing
500 to 750 grams are the subject of much study today. With 500 grams
the mean birth weight at 22 weeks, 12 1 this intense scrutiny suggests that
physicians are attempting to push the threshold of viability back even fur-
ther. In recognition of this new frontier, the World Health Organization,
in its revised recommendations for the collection of perinatal data, has
reduced from 28 to 22 weeks the age that marks the division between
spontaneous abortion and birth.1 22 Many experts believe that because of
the extreme immaturity of a fetus of less than about 23 weeks, 22 or 23
weeks represents an absolute lower limit on fetal viability absent develop-
ment of an artificial placenta. 23 One authority, however, has questioned
the meaningfulness of the notion of a "lower limit" on viability.124
Given the practical difficulties in assessing viability in utero, along with
115. In the Hirata study, it is significant that the mean gestational age in weeks of survivors was
26.5 plus or minus 1.6, while the mean age of babies who died was 25.1 plus or minus 1.3. Hirata,
Epar, Walsh, Mednick, Harris, McGinnis, Sehring & Papedo, supra note 114, at 744 table II.
116. Goldenberg, supra note 113, at 510 (29% of infants born at 25 weeks survived).
117. See, e.g., J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, supra note 4, at 143 (fetuses born at
24th week almost always die shortly after birth); M. HARRISON, M. GOLBUS & R. FILLY, THE
UNBORN PATIEN-r PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 15 (1984) (immaturity of respiratory
system usually prohibits extrauterine life prior to 24 weeks); Ross, supra note 112, at 38 (infants less
than 700 grams at birth usually not viable-this would be between 24 and 25 weeks).
118. Milligan, Shennan & Hoskins, Perinatal Intensive Care: Where and How to Draw the
Line, 148 AM. J. OBsTETRics & GYNECOLOGY 499, 500 table 11 (1984) (reporting survival rates of
14.3% at 23 weeks, 39.1% at 24 weeks and 63.6% at 25 weeks). Goldenberg, supra note 113, at 510
(10-20% survival rate for infants classified as 22-24 weeks gestational age). Of course, birth weight is
a very important factor here. An infant of 24 weeks gestation but in the 90th percentile for weight
would have a greater than 50 percent chance of survival, whereas one in the 10th percentile would
have only an 11% chance. Goldenberg, supra note 113, at 511.
119. See, e.g., Dunn & Stirrat, Capable of Being Born Alive?, 1984 THE LANCET 553, 554 (22
weeks the lowest age at which survival has been recorded); Williams, Creasy, Cunningham, Hawes,
Norris & Tashiro, Fetal Growth and Perinatal Viability in California, 59 OBSTETRics & GYNE-
COLOGY 624 figure 1 (1982) (survival statistics showing some survivals down to 22 weeks).
120. Stubblefield, Some Medical Considerations, in Symposium, Late Abortion and Technologi-
cal Advances in Fetal Viability, 17 FAMILY PLANNING P.RSPS. 161, 162 (1985).
121. Stubblefield, Late Abortion and Fetal Viability 8 (unpublished paper presented at Planned
Parenthood Symposium, Dec. 14 & 15, 1984) (on file with author). See also Goldenberg, supra note
113, at 510 Fig. 2.
122. World Health Organization, Definitions and Recommendations: International Classifica-
tion of Disease, Vol. 1, pp. 763-68 (1979).
123. See, e.g., Dunn & Stirrat, supra note 119, at 554.
124. Campbell, Which Infants Should Not Receive Intensive Care?, 57 ARCHIVES DISEASE IN
CHILDHOOD 569, 569 (1982) (threshold of viability has changed so strikingly that it is arguable
whether any lower limit is valid concept).
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the slow but seemingly continuing changes in the time of viability, it is
clear that statutes regulating post-viability abortion will also affect late
second trimester abortions. The Supreme Court recognized this likelihood
in Colautti, noting that in the face of difficulties in assessing fetal age and
disagreement in equating a particular chance of survival with viability, "it
is not unlikely that experts will disagree over whether a particular fetus in
the second trimester has advanced to the stage of viability."' 25 Thus phy-
sicians could have legitimate disagreements both as to whether an abortion
could be performed at 23 weeks in the absence of a threat to the woman's
life or health, and whether, if an abortion is performed at twenty-three
weeks, post-viability requirements concerning abortion technique, the
presence of a second physician, etc., should apply.
The tendency for strict third trimester regulations to have a chilling
effect on late second trimester abortions can be mitigated, to a certain ex-
tent, by making clear that a physician assessing viability cannot be penal-
ized for being incorrect, but can only be required to act in good faith.12
Even under a good faith medical judgment standard, however, post-
viability regulations will increasingly affect the availability of second tri-
mester abortions. Many physicians and hospitals adopt an abortion cut-off
a bit earlier than viability, to avoid testing the limits of the law. Further-
more, if viability continues to inch earlier, the second trimester (in legal
terms) necessarily will continue to shrink. The technological implication
of the viability standard-that if viability grows earlier, the time during
which women can choose to abort decreases-has long been recognized."
27
The Court, by leaving the viability standard flexible for advances in medi-
cal technology, 128 has appeared to accept this implication, at least to some
extent. Indeed, the Court's view that viability as a dividing point in preg-
nancy has "logical and biological justifications" seems to allow technology
to define the parameters of the abortion right.129 But does viability's im-
portance stem from logic and biology, or does its importance instead de-
pend on social context, convention, and mores?
125. 439 U.S. at 396.
126. In Colautti, because the Court held the viability determination provision void on its face, it
did not reach the issue of whether, under a properly drafted statute, the Constitution requires a
finding of bad faith or scienter for holding a physician criminally responsible for an erroneous deter-
mination of viability. However, the Court strongly hinted that scienter would be required, stating
that: "The prospect of such disagreement, in conjunction with a statute imposing strict civil and crimi-
nal liability for an erroneous determination of viability, could have a profound chilling effect on the
willingness of physicians to perform abortions near the point of viability in the manner indicated by
their best medical judgment." Id. Moreover, the Court has frequently emphasized that physicians
must be given room to make their best medical judgments. Id. at 397; Akron, 462 U.S. at 427.
127. See Bok, supra note 92, at 44-45; Tribe, supra note 45, at 3 n.18; Comment, Viability and
Abortion, 64 Ky. L.J. 146, 161 (1975).
128. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387.
129. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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2. Assessing the Claims of Biological and Logical Relevance
What change occurs at the point when a fetus becomes viable? To con-
sider this, we must recognize that fetal development is inherently a contin-
uum. Approximately a week after fertilization (the union of the sperm
and egg) the embryo implants itself in the uterine wall. 30 Twinning can
still occur for about two weeks after fertilization.1 31 Organs begin to form
in the developing fetus quite early, and by ten weeks all organs exist in
the rudimentary form.1 32 Some minor, unorganized electrical activity in
the fetal brain is detectable as early as between weeks 8 and 12,133 al-
though such rudimentary activity does not indicate a capacity for human
consciousness.1 3 As development continues, quickening-the maternal
awareness of fetal movement-occurs, usually sometime between weeks 17
and 20.1"5 With current technology, the fetus then becomes viable at
around week 24.
As this brief summary shows, viability does not mark a particular bio-
logical change in the fetus. The viable fetus has no more capability for
self-awareness or feeling pain than a pre-viable fetus. This conclusion fol-
lows from the fact that viability advances with medical technology, while
fetal development remains the same over time. A viable fetus has simply
acquired the capacity to survive ex utero if given appropriate life sup-
ports, whereas survival of a pre-viable fetus will depend upon it remain-
ing in the womb for an additional period prior to removal. But at the
threshold of viability, even this newfound capacity to survive signifies
nothing more than a statistical prediction that with months of intensive
care, this infant just might make it. Given the continuity of fetal develop-
ment over time, and the dependence of viability on medical technology
130. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, supra note 4, at 139 figure 8-1, 140.
131. Grobstein, The Moral Uses of 'Spare' Embryos, HASTINGS CENTER REP,., June 1982, at 5,
6.
132. By 8 weeks, fingers and toes are present. After 10 weeks, few if any new major structures
are formed. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, supra note 4, at 140. Embryologists con-
sider 10 weeks to mark the end of the embryonic period and the beginning of the fetal period. Id.
133. Sokol & Rosen, The Fetal Eleetronencephalogram, I CLINICS OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
123, 124 (1974). For a general description of fetal brain development and an argument in favor of
basing abortion policy on fetal neurological development, see Note, supra note 45. That writer sug-
gests that, because the time of most rapid brain development is from 19 to 30 weeks, the capacity for
consciousness probably develops then, such that abortions should be prohibited once such development
begins. Id. at 1207-08, 1214.
134. It is not until between weeks 24 and 28 that the cerebral cortex (the part of the brain
responsible for rational thought) takes on the structure that is characteristic of a normal human being.
See R. LEMIRE, J. LOESER, R. LEECH & E. ALVORD, NORMAL AND ABNORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF
THE HUMAN NERVOUS SYSTEM 235 (1975). Even writers recommending "brain birth" as the biologi-
cal criterion to determine abortion policy recognize that correlating electrical activity with thought
processes is at this point in time impossible. Note, supra note 45, at 1209.
135. Reynolds, Fetal Physiology, in OBSTETRICAL PRACTICE 78, 95 (S. Aladjem ed. 1980).
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rather than on any change in the fetus, the biological significance of via-
bility seems questionable at best-a better term would be technological.
What about viability's logical significance, though? The Roe Court said
only that at viability the fetus could potentially survive outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. But this, of course, is nothing
more than the definition of viability. As John Hart Ely has eloquently
argued, the Court simply "mis[took] a definition for a syllogism."' 136
Other scholars have even suggested that viability's logical significance is in
fact the opposite of what the Court implies. As one group asks: "Why
should a fetus' capacity to live independently be a reason to forbid the
mother from forcing it to live independently?"1 17 John Robertson suggests
that logically, the pre-viable fetus should have the greater claim on the
woman, because its life depends on her, whereas the viable fetus can be
removed and still survive.1 3 8
This logic, however, ignores the medical realities of premature delivery.
An eight month fetus can be removed and simply survive, given ordinary
care. But the issue is not aborting eight month fetuses. 39 It is whether the
threshold of viability should constitute the cut-off point for abortions, and
fetuses delivered at the threshold of viability do not simply survive upon
removal. They live, if at all, only with months of highly sophisticated,
aggressive, and costly treatment,140 which causes suffering to infant and
parents alike.141 Moreover, infants born extremely prematurely face a
great risk of physical and mental handicap: In one study, 26 percent of
survivors born between weeks 24 and 26 had a significant functional
handicap.142 Thus, given today's medical realities, it would be irresponsi-
136. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924
(1973).
137. Fost, Chudwin & Wikler, supra note 109, at 12-13.
138. See Robertson, Medicolegal Implications of a Human Life Amendment, in DEFINING
HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 161, 166 (M. Shaw & E. Doudera
eds. 1983).
139. According to Dr. Kenneth Ryan, before the Supreme Court decision in Roe, doctors would
not even have considered a third trimester procedure to induce, for medical reasons, an early delivery
to be an abortion. Statement of Dr. Kenneth Ryan, Chairman, Department of Obstetrics and Gyne-
cology, Harvard Medical School at Hastings Center Conference on Abortion and Scientific Change
(May 23-24, 1985). Beyond the time of viability, the procedures for removal ordinarily present the
same risks to the woman whether the fetus is saved or destroyed. Tribe, supra note 45, at 4 n.24.
140. See P. BUDETrI, P. MCMANuS, N. BARRAND & L. HEINEN, supra note 111, at 19-23;
Pomerance, Ukrainski, Ukra, Henderson, Nash & Meredith, Cost of Living for Infants Weighing
1000 Grams or Less at Birth, 61 PEDIATRICS 908, 909 (1978).
141. See generally R. STINSON & P. STINSON, THE LONG DYING OF BABY ANDREW (1983)
(parents describing premature infant's suffering and anguish over his lengthy, and ultimately futile,
treatment in intensive care unit).
142. Yu, Orgill, Bajuk & Astbury, supra note 101, at 643 table 5. Another 8 percent had a
milder degree of physical disability. At 27-28 weeks, 14 percent had a significant functional handicap
and another 3 percent had a lesser physical disability. Id. See also Orgill, Astbury, Bajuk & Yu,
supra note 114, at 824 (of infants weighing between 501 and 750 grams who survived, 27 percent
were handicapped upon follow-up).
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ble and even cruel to advocate simply allowing viable fetuses to be re-
moved, especially since the removal process itself can harm the fragile,
premature fetus.""3
We can, however, readily imagine a more sophisticated medical context
in which artificial gestation after a particular time were as benign as nat-
ural gestation. If this time occurred relatively early in pregnancy, it might
be reasonable to encourage women to nurture fetuses until viability, after
which they could be transferred elsewhere. Such a different medical con-
text would indeed make viability's import the opposite of what the Court
found it to be in Roe. This hypothetical suggests that the viability stan-
dard lacks a logical or universal basis, but is instead situation-specific in
its importance.
144
Once it is recognized that the relevance of viability depends upon the
medical context, the claim of "logical" justification for the viability stan-
dard sounds a trifle grandiose.1 45 Perhaps, in assessing viability's true (al-
beit more limited) importance, it will help to spell out briefly the ways in
which today's medical context renders viability relevant. First, a post-
viability abortion may result in a live birth, in which case the physician
will be under an ethical and legal obligation to treat the infant if viable as
she would an infant delivered in planned childbirth. 146 Yet the premature
delivery and its artificial induction may have caused severe and irrevoca-
ble harm. Intentionally inducing an extremely premature delivery in the
absence of maternal health reasons would be malpractice of the grossest
kind, and the occasional live birth from a late abortion creates medical
and ethical dilemmas of a harrowing nature. 14 Live births from abortions
143. In general, the more immature the fetus, the greater the risks from labor and delivery. J.
PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, supra note 4, at 756.
144. Of course, the Court could have meant "logical" not in the strong sense of being subject to
logical proof or, at least, argument, but in the weaker sense of being a practical or justifiable place to
draw a line. If the weaker interpretation is used, then viability could be considered a "logical" point
at which to draw a line under one set of medical facts, but be a completely irrelevant point under
another. See infra text accompanying notes 146-57.
145. In regard to the claim of "logical and biological justification," one writer has stated:
First, the mind boggles when Blackmun tells us that the holding has multiple justifications,
one logical and one biological. Neither the principles of logic nor the facts of biology could
individually yield a justification; only by combining the two can even an enthymatic argument
be produced. Anyway, the cited premise-'the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb'-is not a bit of biology or logic, but only a bare
definition.
Wertheimer, Understanding Blackmun's Argument: The Reasoning of Roe v. Wade, in ABORTION:
MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 105, 120 (J. Garfield & P. Hennessey eds. 1984).
146. See Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abortions, 72 GEo. L.J.
1451, 1470-72 (1984).
147. See generally Rhoden, supra note 146. The dilemma about treatment, the harsh violation of
the expectations of the woman, physician and staff, and the strong possibility of resulting brain dam-
age combine to make this situation agonizing. See also Kleiman, When Abortion Becomes Birth: A
Dilemma of Medical Ethics Shaken by New Advances, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at B1, col. 1.
(offering statistics and differing approaches to problem).
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thus should, if at all possible, be avoided, and allowing states to prohibit
post-viability abortions assists such avoidance.
The post-viability abortion of fetuses in such a way that they are born
alive but sustain severe damage is not, however, a necessary consequence
of allowing some post-viability abortions. If the threshold of viability oc-
curs earlier, it may approach the time during which D & E is a safe
abortion method. Even under the existing threshold, doctors often, when
performing abortions late in the second trimester, add some saline or urea
to the prostaglandin, in order to reduce the possibility of live birth. This
combination has medical justification as well in that it reduces the gastro-
intestinal side effects of prostaglandin. ' 4 Additionally, some physicians
advocate injecting digoxin into the fetus' heart to cause cardiac arrest in
utero,'49 an action that is unrelated to the woman's health and is solely
designed to ensure fetal death in utero.
Because its sole purpose is to ensure fetal death in utero, this last
method makes us uncomfortably aware of what post-viability abortion is
all about. The graphic nature of the digoxin procedure also highlights the
second way in which viability is important. Before viability, removing an
unwanted fetus from the womb necessarily entails its destruction. After
viability, however, these dual functions of removal and destruction di-
verge. It is no longer severance alone that is fatal, but severance via a
particular abortion method. If the fetus could live if removed by method
A, then removing it by lethal method B becomes more morally problem-
atic, because fetal destruction is no longer a necessary consequence of pre-
mature removal. As Laurence Tribe has stated:
Once the fetus can be severed from the womb by a process which
enables it to survive, leaving the abortion decision to private choice
would confer not only a right to remove an unwanted fetus from
one's body but also an entirely separate right to ensure its death.150
Thus the time of viability marks the point at which the distinction be-
tween abortion (the termination of pregnancy) and feticide (destruction of
the fetus) becomes "practical and meaningful." 15'
Recognition of this distinction suggests that perhaps the Court was not
confusing a definition with a syllogism, but was merely being a bit cryptic
148. See Kerenyi, supra note 31, at 359, 371. However, there may still occasionally be a live birth
with these combination methods. Id. at 372.
149. See Waters, Digoxin Induction Abortion, Paper presented at Eighth Annual Meeting, The
National Abortion Federation, in Los Angeles, California (May 14, 1984).
150. Tribe, supra note 45, at 27 (emphasis in original).
151. Wertheimer, supra note 145, at 121 ("there seems to be nothing significant about viability
independent of its being the condition in which the distinction between abortion and feticide is practi-
cal and meaningful").
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in explicating viability's significance. Writers defending the viability stan-
dard have addressed this judicial omission, arguing that because a viable
fetus has the capacity for ex utero survival (not merely the potential if left
to develop longer), it is similar in all relevant respects to an infant.152
Unlike the pre-viable fetus, which will perish absent the womb's suste-
nance, the viable fetus can "move outdoors" if medical assistance is pro-
vided. After viability, the argument goes, it is mere happenstance, an acci-
dent of geography, that distinguishes the fetus from the independently
existing infant.153 It is, as one writer puts it, "only due to this fetus' bad
luck that it is not already a person."' ' Thus, if this argument is accepted,
a state could justifiably conclude that post-viability abortions are uncom-
fortably similar to infanticide. After that point, according to Tribe, abor-
tion could be prohibited:
not because of some illusion that this biologically arbitrary point sig-
nals 'any morally significant change in the developing human,' and
certainly not because of any (necessarily religious) notion that the
fetus is intrinsically a human being from that technology-dependent
point forward, but rather on the secular and quite practical ground
that a state wishing to prevent the killing of infants simply has no
way to distinguish the deliberate destruction of the latter from what
is involved in postviability abortions. 55
This explication of the significance of viability sounds quite persuasive.
It suggests that the importance of viability-the point at which a fetus
could potentially survive ex utero if removed in a harmless manner-may
be unrelated to the time in pregnancy at which viability occurs, and thus
that viability is of logical, and not just medical, significance. Tribe, how-
ever, suggests that this is not the case. He argues that viability's signifi-
cance is indeed dependent upon the existing medical context. According to
Tribe, the use of viability as a legal standard:
assumes a technology in which viability occurs so late in pregnancy
that removing the fetus in a manner consistent with its survival is no
more onerous for the woman than removing it in a way that leads to
its destruction. If this ceases to be the case, however, then the
woman's legitimate interest may come to encompass a claim to sever
even the viable fetus in a manner dangerous to it.156
152. King, supra note 99, at 1676.
153. Zaitchik, Viability and the Morality of Abortion, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 18, 20-21 (1981).
154. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted).
155. Tribe, supra note 45, at 28.
156. Id. at 27 n.118.
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Is Tribe correct that the significance of viability could be diminished or
eliminated entirely if technology, and hence the medical context, change?
This is a crucial question, inasmuch as the threshold of viability is ap-
proaching week 23, but abortion is now safer than childbirth past week
21. In other words, we are approaching precisely that medical context that
Tribe suggested could undermine viability's importance. If viability's rele-
vance is neither logical nor biological, but preeminently contextual, then it
is no violation of Roe's principles to rethink the viability standard once the
medical context changes.
I will argue that the medical context is crucial. The safety of available
abortion methods referred to by Tribe is an important part of this context,
although this alone is not determinative. Neonatal intensive care technol-
ogy is also important, though not necessarily decisive. The idea that a
viable fetus differs from a baby only in geography is most persuasive for
late, i.e., 7 or 8 month old fetuses. It seems far less compelling when the
fetus is "viable" only if provided 5 months of incubation in an artificial
placenta. I will argue that this is because the scientific meaning of viabil-
ity-ex utero survivability-is only one component of the complex ethical
judgment that a viable (under current technology) fetus has a somewhat
different status vis-a-vis the woman than does a less developed fetus.
B. Distinguishing the Scientific from the Ethical
To avoid holding that abortion must be permitted up to the time of
birth, the Roe Court needed somehow to divide the continuum of preg-
nancy. Yet the Court quite reasonably wished to avoid discussions of
when life begins157 or the definition of personhood, that murky, unscien-
tific conglomerate of biological, philosophical and theological claims.15 8
Rather than exploring the idea that personhood evolves gradually
throughout the entire pregnancy, the Court instead selected viability, a
verifiable, empirical, scientific concept, by which to draw its line.159
157. 410 U.S. at 159.
158. "Personhood" is intended here in its philosophical sense, not in the sense of whether X is a
"person" for purposes of a particular legal statute. Although the Court engaged in no discussion of the
meaning of personhood, it did hold that a fetus was not a person for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For a helpful discussion of the problems associated with trying to solve issues in
bioethics through definitions of personhood, see Mackin, Personhood in the Bioethics Literature, 61
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 35 (1983).
159. 410 U.S. at 162-63. The Court believed that if a fetus is a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment, then abortion cannot be justified. 410 U.S. at 156-57. Judith Jarvis Thomson argues,
however, that even if fetuses are persons, continuation of an unwanted pregnancy can be viewed as an
act of "Good Samaritanism," and persons are not ordinarily under an obligation to be Good Samari-
tans and subordinate their bodily interests for the benefit of others. See Thomson, A Defense of Abor-
tion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). Donald Regan has built an equal protection argument upon
Thomson's analysis, arguing that it would violate equal protection to require pregnant women to
sacrifice their bodily interests to benefit third parties when persons in general in our society do not
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In 1973 viability conveniently coincided roughly with the last third of
pregnancy. By the third trimester, the woman's pregnancy is visible to the
world. And much of the world (at least, much of the United States popu-
lation) feels differently about pregnancy at this stage than at earlier ones.
The majority of Americans support the abortion right under at least some
circumstances.1 60 Consistently, however, there is substantially less support
for third trimester abortions than for second, and less for second than for
first."" It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider fully the justifica-
tions for either abortion in general or the widespread difference in attitude
about early and late termination. But I will note that scholars have sought
to defend this societal intuition. For example, Edward Langerak fully rec-
ognizes the weakness of pinpointing any "magic moment" before which a
fetus has no claim for protection and after which it does."6 2 He argues,
however, that the potential to become a person is exceedingly important.
Because the late-term fetus is both more likely to achieve this potential6 3
and already much closer to achieving it, a state can justifiably confer upon
the late-term fetus, though not its less developed cousin, a claim to societal
protection.1 64 Other writers have likewise stressed that "[b]ecause human
life is a developmental continuum it is also morally relevant to advert to
the level of development that an individual has reached or can reach."16 5
Whether or not this dichotomy between late and early abortion is fully
justified, it commands much scholarly respect, probably influenced the
Roe Court, and is perhaps the closest this society has come to a consensus
about the morality of abortion."66
The congruence of viability and late gestation was fortunate because it
enhanced the acceptability of the line the Roe Court established. But in a
very important sense it was unfortunate, because it gave the impression
that the newfound capacity for ex utero survival was all that the viability
have these sorts of legal obligations. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979).
160. J. BURTCHAELL, RACHEL WEEPING 100-02 (1982) (reprinting results of 1979 REDBOOK
poll, & 1977 & 1979 Gallup polls).
161. Id. at 102.
162. Langerak, Abortion: Listening to the Middle, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE
174, 174 (J. Arras & R. Hunt 2d ed. 1983).
163. Langerak notes that the incidence of first trimester spontaneous abortion is variously esti-
mated to be from 15 to greater than 50 percent. Id. at 177.
164. Langerak considers both quickening and viability to be morally relevant times at which the
fetus' claim to societal protection increases. Id. at 178-79. Bok, supra note 92, at 44, takes a similar
position.
165. Mahowald, Abortion and Equality, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES 177, 183
(S. Callahan & D. Callahan eds. 1984); see also Cahill, Abortion, Autonomy and Community, in
ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES 261, 270 ("increasingly human appearance of offspring
during gestation may be relevant to their developing status within the community of persons"); Bok,
supra note 92, at 44 (after viability, only abortions necessary to save woman's life should be allowed
"because the reasons to protect life may now be thought to be partially present").
166. Langerak, supra note 162, at 174.
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standard stood for. The impression given in Roe (and later in Danforth
and Colautti) was that the actual time of viability (the last third of preg-
nancy) was an accidental characteristic irrelevant to the legal cut-off,
which was determined solely by the fact of survivability. But while tech-
nological survivability exhausts the medical definition of viability, the via-
bility standard as an ethical or normative dividing line is more compli-
cated. It encompasses, as a necessary, non-accidental characteristic, the
idea that the fetus has reached the societally-significant stage of "late ges-
tation." Because survivability happened to coincide with late gestation in
1973, the importance of late gestation for the Roe dividing line has subse-
quently been taken for granted or overlooked. Only now, as the specter of
the divergence of viability and late gestation looms increasingly large, is it
becoming apparent that the continuing relevance of the viability standard
is dependent upon the medical context remaining substantially similar to
that which prevailed in 1973.
A hypothetical medical scenario helps to demonstrate that potential
survivability would hold less legal significance if it occurred much earlier
than it does now. Assume that surfactant (a substance necessary for lung
inflatability) has unexpectedly been discovered to be present in fetal lungs
between weeks 18 and 20. Assume also that medical technology has ad-
vanced sufficiently that infants possessing this substance can be sustained
by artificial means.167 Suppose, however, that: (1) fetal development is
such that surfactant is absent between weeks 21 and 23; and (2) efforts to
insert surfactant in infants' lungs are invariably unsuccessful. Given these
assumptions, an 18-to-20 week fetus would be viable, while a 21-to-23
week fetus would not. If viability is determinative in every context, then
given these assumptions the state could reasonably deny a 19-week preg-
nant woman an abortion, but would be bound to let her return for the
procedure at week 21. Because D & E at week 19 is probably the safest
procedure for the woman and is inevitably feticidal, this outcome is ludi-
crous. Its absurdity suggests that survivability alone cannot be
determinative.
The new technology of embryo transfer may also illustrate the impor-
tance of the medical context. Doctors are now able, prior to implantation,
to flush an embryo out of one woman and insert it into the uterus of a
second woman." 8 If the second woman's womb is considered an "artificial
aid,""' the embryo during that brief time span is viable-i.e., medical
167. These assumptions are, of course, completely hypothetical.
168. See Blakeslee, Infertile Woman Has Baby Through Embryo Transfer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1984, at 6, col. 1. See generally L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS 246-58 (1984).
169. Embryo transfer technology, as it exists at present, does not pose problems for the viability
standard, because one can readily argue that an embryo is not viable if it must be inside some wo-
man's womb. This scenario could become more complicated, however, if the embryo could remain
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technology has already created a brief "window of viability." But again,were a woman somehow sure that she was pregnant so early on that anembryo transfer was feasible, it would be absurd to deny her an abortion(or a menstrual extraction)... and make her wait until transfer was nolonger possible so that her embryo would not be viable. These examplesillustrate that the significance of viability depends upon a specific set ofmedical facts. If these facts change, so too does viability's significance.
The importance of viability could likewise be undermined from the op-posite direction. Suppose that infant mortality research yielded the dra-matic and surprising discovery that infants with a certain genetic defectwill inevitably die if born more than 2 weeks before term. This rare (in-deed fictional) defect impairs only in utero development-babies with thisdefect born at 8 months or more will be fine, but are non-viable beforethis time. Assume also that this defect can be diagnosed prenatally. A sup-porter of the viability standard would probably not feel comfortable aboutan elective abortion of such a fetus at 8 months. But this response is in-consistent with the notion that technological survivability is all that mat-ters. If Roe really stands for survivability being determinative, then thewoman carrying this fetus should have a constitutional right to abort it
even at 8 months gestation.
The point of this example, like the surfactant one, is to illustrate theimportance of the fact that the two threads-survivability and late gesta-tion-coincided in 1973 at the time of viability, thereby making viabilitylook determinative. Viability as simple technological survivability (let'scall this Viability1) does not accord with our intuitions about the moralityof abortion in either the surfactant hypothetical or the case of the 8 monthnon-viable fetus. This is because it has been severed from its conceptualsister-late gestation. Viability as a normative concept thus has at leasttwo major components. It is not merely technological, but rather encom-passes the idea that the fetus is so substantially developed that it has aclaim to societal protection. This latter sense of viability (Viability2) is, Ibelieve, what the court really meant in Roe, or at least what it would have
outside of the first woman for a significant period of time before being implanted in the second
woman.
In in vitro fertilization, the egg is fertilized in the test tube and develops there until it reaches aboutthe eight-cell stage, which is the best time to be implanted in the woman's womb. COUNCIL FORSCIENCE AND SOCIETY, HUMAN PROCREATION: ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW TECHNIQUES 16(1984). It has been noted that extra embryos (ones not being implanted) could possibly be allowed tocontinue to develop in the test-tube, perhaps to the stage where cells separate into primitive special-ized tissue (nerve, muscle, etc.). Id. at 18. If this became possible, would the embryo that could gowithout a womb for 3 or 4 weeks be viable for this time?170. Aspiration of the endometrial cavity within 1 to 3 weeks after failure to menstruate is calledmenstrual extraction or menstrual induction. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, supranote 4, at 481.
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meant had it thoroughly analyzed viability's significance. 
Viability simply
designated that time after which a fetus, although 
not a person in a consti-
tutional sense, has nonetheless progressed so far 
in development that the
state could legitimately protect its potential for 
independent life despite
the woman's privacy right.
Separating Viability1 (technological survivability) 
from Viability2 (the
complex, value-laden notion that once a fetus can 
survive ex utero and is
substantially developed, its claim to societal protection 
increases) helps ex-
plain the confusion that the viability standard 
has engendered among com-
mentators. Claiming significance for mere survivability 
is to mistake a
definition for a syllogism. It is likewise to suggest 
that from a technologi-
cal fact alone (that the fetus could survive) one 
can derive the value judg-
ment that abortion can properly be proscribed.
171 But claiming signifi-
cance for Viability2 is not a mistake. Rather, 
it is to understand that
because developmental status is relevant, late abortion 
is more morally
problematic than earlier abortion. It is then to 
seek conscientiously some
way to distinguish early from late. Viability2 is 
what is known in philoso-
phy as a "cluster concept"-a concept made up 
of several important com-
ponents, none of which is sufficient 
to define it.17
2 The surfactant hypo-
thetical illustrates that survivability is not a sufficient 
condition to give a
fetus Viability 2, that is, to give it an ethical claim 
upon society. Nor is
survivability a necessary condition for Viability2
: The hypothetical non-
viable 8 month fetus seems too fully developed 
to be aborted, even though
it still needs shelter in the woman's womb. Survivability 
is of course im-
portant, but it is not determinative, because late 
gestation is likewise an
important (and, it seems, necessary) component 
of the normative concept,
Viability 2. We must distinguish Viability1 
from Viability2 if we are to
make sense of viability's true importance and the 
nature of its limitations.
Inasmuch as there is no word for the complex 
ethical concept called
Viability2, and inasmuch as there was no 
reason for the Court to imagine,
in 1973, that fetuses would become viable substantially 
earlier in gesta-
tion, it is understandable that the Court did not 
distinguish the technologi-
cal concept from the ethical one. Yet by implying, 
and by continuing to
imply, that technological survivability is itself 
determinative, the Court's
decisions have created the misleading impression 
that a scientific or tech-
nological fact can give rise to a normative legal 
standard without being
171. For the classic statement of the view that 
moral conclusions cannot be deduced from factual
premises, see D. HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN 
NATURE, Book III, pt. I, § I (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.
1951). See generally Ethical Naturalism, in 3 THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 69-71 (P. Ed-
wards ed. 1967).
172. See Putnam, The Analytic and the Synthetic, in 
3 MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF SCIENCE 358, 378 (H. Feigl & G. Maxwell 
eds. 1962) (for some words, such as "man", the
meaning is given by a cluster of properties).
Trimesters and Technology
influenced by moral values and analysis. An abortion cut-off should not
depend on one aspect of the medical context while ignoring others. Nor
can it leap from facts to values without the mediating influence of prevail-
ing societal mores. Perhaps the most one can expect of an abortion cut-off
is, as one writer puts it, that it:
allow[s] women self-determination, the preservation of their lives and
health, the effective use of pre-natal diagnosis, and the achievement
of other societal goals such as the prevention of the births of un-
wanted children, while avoiding undue insult to practices of
parenthood and of attention and kindness toward children, etc. 173
In 1973, the time of technological viability was a very good place to
draw a line marking the boundary of the abortion right. But if viability
ceases to coincide with late gestation, it will no longer achieve the same
goals. Roe does not, however, require the law to abdicate control of
women's constitutional fate to technology. To avoid such technological tyr-
anny, the Court need merely recognize the important, albeit silent and
largely implicit, role that late gestation played in forming the foundation
of the Roe framework.
III. REVAMPING Roe v. Wade
A. Abandoning the First Trimester/Second Trimester Distinction
The serious problems plaguing each prong of the trimester system dic-
tate reconsideration of the Roe schema. The first, and by far the simplest,
part of this task is to recognize that the division between the first and
second trimesters is unnecessary and confusing, and should be abandoned.
As shown in Part I, statistical variations in abortion safety at different
times in pregnancy are inadequate to justify changes in the state's degree
of interest in an abortion patient's health. Drawing a distinction between
early abortion and abortion in mid-pregnancy may well have increased
Roe's societal acceptance. 14 By allowing increased state regulation after
week 12, the Court both distanced its decision from the much maligned
notion of legalizing "abortion on demand" and implied that abortion, even
prior to viability, could be treated differently from other medical proce-
dures. This difference in treatment is indefensible. Although abortion is
ethically different from other medical procedures, this difference has to do
with the potential life of the fetus, not with the woman's health. There-
173. Engelhardt, Viability and the Use of the Fetus, in ABORTION AND THE STATUS OF THE
Frus 183, 193 (W. Bondeson, H. Engelhardt, S. Spicker & D. Winship eds. 1983).
174. See Tribe, supra note 45, at 38 n.168.
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fore, up until the time that potential life can be protected, there is no
justification for treating abortion differently from other medical proce-
dures. Because the week 12 division suggests that there is a justification, it
encourages anti-abortion legislatures to enact restrictive second trimester
abortion regulations, and obscures the important questions of why partic-
ular requirements are being imposed (especially if the contrast with other
health regulations is marked) and whether regulations purportedly pro-
moting health really represent attempts to discourage abortions.
1"'
This focus on the purpose behind abortion regulations permeated Doe
v. Bolton, where the Court emphasized that Georgia had no requirement
of two-doctor concurrence or committee approval for medical procedures
other than abortions."' Doe v. Bolton does not stand for the proposition
that any abortion regulation that lacks an existing statutory parallel must
be declared invalid. In Danforth, the Court noted that Missouri did not
require the patient's prior written consent to any surgical procedure other
than abortion, but stated that this "is not in itself an unconstitutional re-
quirement. The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a
stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full
knowledge of its nature and consequences.
'" 1 77
As the Seventh Circuit in Friendship Medical Center v. Chicago Board
of Health 17  noted, however, a wide disparity between abortion regula-
tions and all other medical regulations should be grounds for 
suspicion.17 9
Thus the Seventh Circuit was rightfully suspicious when the Chicago
175. The Third Circuit has held that courts may not invalidate an entire abortion statute simply
because of a pervasive invalid intent, but must review its separate provisions on their merits. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 292 (3d Cir. 1984), argued, 54 U.S.L.W.
3343 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1985). The court felt it was obliged, based on the Supreme Court's review of
abortion statutes, to take this approach, even though the Pennsylvania act clearly was inspired by
strong anti-abortion motives. See id. at 288.
176. 410 U.S. 179, 197, 199 (1973).
177. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1975). The Court continued:
We could not say that a requirement imposed by the State that a prior written consent for any
surgery would be unconstitutional. As a consequence, we see no constitutional defect in requir-
ing it only for some types of surgery as, for example, an intracardiac procedure, or where the
surgical risk is elevated above a specified mortality level, or, for that matter, for abortions.
Id. Many medical decisions are stressful. Informed consent to medical procedure is ethically and
legally desirable, and a state could readily require general informed consent to medical procedures.
The fact that it has not enacted such a requirement for other procedures does not invalidate a non-
specific and unbiased informed consent requirement for abortions.
178. 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
179. The court stated that:
Where fundamental rights are involved, it is impermissible to treat differently two classes
which do not differ on any ground related to the purpose of the challenged statute. Given the
Supreme Court's acceptance of the medical fact that the mortality rate of women receiving
legal abortions is 'as low or lower than the rates for normal childbirth,' there would seem to be
little justification for more extensive governmental regulations, purportedly based on health
considerations, for one procedure than the other.
Id. at 1152 (citations omitted).
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Board of Health enacted abortion regulations requiring the performance
of particular medical tests, the availability of certain equipment and sup-
plies, and the postponement of the abortion procedure for a specific inter-
val after the initial examination, but left the safety of all other medical
procedures to the good judgment of the physician.180 Although the court
did not proscribe all differences between regulation of abortion and other
medical procedures,181 it refused to ignore the disparity. It held that "the
state will bear a heavy burden in justifying any such regulation, both with
respect to showing the existence of a unique medical complication and
with respect to showing that the problem is of such a nature as to be
beyond the general scope of a doctor's professional judgment."1812 In that
case, not only did the abortion regulations lack statutory parallels in other
areas, but such detailed regulation of other medical procedures was ex-
ceedingly unlikely. This type of comparison is valuable, and is made much
easier by discarding the notion that a compelling interest in maternal
health springs into existence at a particular point in pregnancy.
The cases since Roe, however, have paid little heed to one implication
of the original first trimester/second trimester division-the notion that as
long as abortion is safer than childbirth, women must be free to choose
this safer alternative without state interference. Akron, of course, modified
Roe somewhat by holding that the state could still enact significant regula-
tions after week 12 even though some abortions past this time were now
safer than childbirth. But the Court in Akron was not presented with the
issue of whether a state could prohibit abortions safer than childbirth
based on fetal viability. With the latest figures showing abortion safer
than childbirth even after week 21, however, the collision of trimesters of
which Justice O'Connor warned is close upon us. The retention of the
week 12 dividing line will avoid only the appearance of this clash, not its
reality. It will not decide the question of whether, if medical advances
make some post-viability abortions safer than childbirth, states will be
able to subordinate their interest in maternal health and the woman's in-
terest in avoiding health risks to the goal of protecting potential life.
180. Id. Also, in Hallmark Clinic v. Department of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153,
1157-58 (E.D.N.C. 1974), the court, in discussing regulation of abortion procedures, stated: "That
the state is ordinarily willing to leave such matters to the professional judgment of the attending
physician strongly suggests that the program for regulating abortion clinics is a thinly disguised effort
to evade Roe and Doe."
181. The Court stated:
We do not, however, completely rule out the possibility that there exist some inherent aspects
of an abortion procedure which make it unique from other medical procedures of substantially
the same risk. For such aspects, the Board of Health may be able to show that a narrowly
drawn health regulation is compelling.
Friendship Medical Center, 505 F.2d at 1154.
182. Id.
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Abandoning the notion that the state's degree of interest in the woman's
health changes with fluctuations in abortion safety also does not fully re-
solve this issue. It does, however, suggest that medical technology, which
determines the safety of abortion with respect to both childbirth and the
time of fetal viability, is best viewed as an important, but not necessarily
controlling, concern. The increased safety of late second trimester abor-
tions is probably best incorporated into our discussion of how to fashion a
reasonable and justifiable limitation on elective abortions.
B. Constitutionalizing Viability2
Despite all its problems, allowing states to use fetal survivability as a
cut-off for elective abortion has one significant practical advantage: It is a
time that can be empirically determined. But while medical statistics can
show that 15, 30 or 50 percent of fetuses born at a particular gestational
age survive, Viability2 cannot be so readily ascertained. "Late gestation"
is a far less precise concept, and one that is, in large part, in the eye of the
beholder. Even if late gestation was an important (albeit implicit) compo-
nent of the Supreme Court's viability standard, how could the Court im-
plement a standard as subjective as late gestation if viability becomes pos-
sible significantly earlier in pregnancy?
There are two potential responses to the question of how to proceed if
technological survivability and late gestation diverge, and each has certain
advantages. The first would be analogous to the Court's retention, in Ak-
ron, of the week 12 dividing line despite the demise of its maternal mor-
tality rate justification. Just as the Court adhered to the original trimester
framework in that instance, the Court could hold that week 24 constitutes
a workable lower limit on a state's ability to prohibit abortions. This ap-
proach would, of course, constitute a deviation from the Court's previous
insistence that viability, and not any particular number of weeks, is the
crucial factor. But it would have the advantage of retaining a limit that
many doctors have for some time viewed as the de facto cut-off, and that
is explicitly (though probably inappropriately) incorporated into some
state statutes.18 Because amniocentesis results are usually available by
about week 20,184 a week 24 limitation allows sufficient leeway for most
abortions for genetic defects and thus neither makes such abortions un-
available nor requires that they be treated differently in the law from
other abortions.
The second approach is to focus specifically on what constitutes the
183. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1975); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, §
12M (Michie/Law. Co-op 1981).
184. See text accompanying notes 196-202 for the time parameters involved in amniocentesis.
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lower limit beyond which viability loses its dual meanings of survivability
and late gestation. This approach would become necessary only if simply
adhering to week 24 is rejected and if medical advances were to render
fetuses viable earlier than 24 weeks. In other words, we may never have
to ask how early in gestation cannot reasonably be deemed late. Nonethe-
less, in the event it does become necessary to do so, it is useful to consider
briefly the medical, ethical, psychological, and social factors that inform
the judgment that we should not allow technology to limit a woman's pri-
vacy right earlier than a particular time in pregnancy. 8 5
It should be recognized that consideration of relevant factors will un-
doubtedly identify a range of time that is significant, rather than a partic-
ular week. But this is not an unusual result in the realm of judicial or
legislative line drawing. For example, no one would argue that a 55 mile
per hour speed limit, as opposed to 56 or 54, has any special significance.
However, a speed limit somewhere between 50 and 70, given current au-
tomobile technology, highway conditions and driving customs, can be jus-
tified as being within a range that effectively represents "not too fast."
Persons approving of any speed limit at all could probably agree that 15
m.p.h. is too slow and 90 m.p.h. too fast. Similarly, there can be a time
period which, given current social conditions, modes of contraception, neo-
natal care technology, etc., represents "not too late." Persons favoring at
least some access to abortion could probably agree that 8 weeks is too
185. This approach does not imply that a state has no interest in potential life prior to the time
when it chooses to limit a woman's privacy right. Instead it recognizes that a state cannot act on itsinterest without infringing the woman's right, just as a father dearly has an interest in the decision
between abortion and childbirth, but protecting his interest would necessarily infringe upon thewoman's right to decide. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71. Justice O'Connor would ignore the irreconcil-
able conflict between protecting potential life and allowing the woman an unencumbered abortion
right. She would allow states to regulate abortion for the purpose of protecting potential life at anytime during pregnancy and would uphold regulations that "inhibit" abortions as long as they do not"unduly burden" them. Akron, 462 U.S. at 461-64. In the absence of an undue burden, she would
eschew strict scrutiny and would uphold a regulation if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimatestate purpose. Id. at 462-65. This "undue burden" standard was the one used in the abortion funding
cases. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977).Several lower courts used this method of review in abortion cases dealing with state regulations rather
than with the refusal to fund abortions. See, e.g., Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron,
479 F. Supp. 1172, 1200 (N.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1198 (1981),
aff d in part and rev'd in part, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen,477 F. Supp. 542, 545 (D. Me. 1979). The Supreme Court majority in Akron, however, emphaticallyrejected this less stringent standard of review in favor of the straightforward strict scrutiny utilized in
Roe. 462 U.S. at 420 n.1. This is more in keeping with standard constitutional analysis thanO'Connor's proposed method of scrutiny. Ordinarily the character of the affected right, i.e., whether it
is fundamental, determines the degree of scrutiny. See, e.g., Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,68 (1981); Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1204 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Note, Hospitalization Requirements
for Second Trimester Abortions: For the Purpose of Health or Hindrance?, 71 GEO. L.J. 991, 1012(1983). The question of whether the burden is undue is typically the ultimate constitutional issue,
rather than the initial barrier to obtaining strict scrutiny. Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 777 (7th
Cir. 1980); Ford, The Evolution of a Constitutional Right to an Abortion 4 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 291
(1983); Note, supra, at 1011-12.
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early and 8 months too late. Thus it is appropriate that Viability2 be
viewed as a time range rather than a specific point in time.
One of the most important considerations in demarcating this range is
the looming issue of infanticide. States undoubtedly can protect the lives of
infants.""6 Hence it is reasonable to allow states to prohibit the intentional
destruction of fetuses that are virtually indistinguishable from infants. As
we have seen, probably the strongest argument for adhering to technologi-
cal survivability as a limitation is that once a fetus can survive ex utero, it
is virtually indistinguishable from a baby. We have also seen, however,
that this fetus-baby similarity is much more convincing for very late term,
substantially developed fetuses than for those at the threshold of viability,
who require vast amounts of high technology medical care in order to
survive.
Babies born at 24-25 weeks have been referred to as "fetal infants,"
'
in recognition of their developmental immaturity. Because technology,
whatever its promise, cannot affect in utero development, if in the future
babies born before week 24 can survive, they will still be at a far earlier
stage of development than that which we ordinarily associate with a
baby."8 " Technology is also unlikely to alter society's perceptions of when
a pregnant woman crosses that fuzzy boundary into "late gestation."
1 9 It
186. See, e.g., In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (overriding parental refusal of
blood transfusions for child); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) (same). See gener-
ally Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk. On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86
YALE L.J. 645 (1977).
187. Hack, Fanaroff & Merkatz, The Low-Birth-Weight Infant-Evolution of a Changing Out-
look, 301 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1164 (1979).
188. As noted previously, many experts believe that the extreme immaturity of fetal lungs and
other organs before 22 weeks gestation makes survival exceedingly unlikely either now or in the
future, at least without recourse to an artificial placenta. Dunn & Stirrat, supra note 119, at 554.
Several writers have suggested that the Supreme Court make a distinction between those fetuses
whose lungs have matured sufficiently for them to survive if given the type of intensive care currently
available, and those that someday may be "viable" if placed in artificial wombs. See Survey of Abor-
tion Law, supra note 8, at 144.
189. It has been suggested that the use of ultrasound to see the fetus early in pregnancy creates an
earlier maternal/fetal bonding. Statements of Dan Callahan, Director, The Hastings Center, and Dr.
Alan Fleischman, Director, Division of Neonatology and Associate Professor of Pediatrics, Albert
Einstein College of Medicine, at Hastings Center Conference on Abortion and Scientific Change
(May 23-24, 1985). Thus it is at least theoretically possible that women themselves could consider
"late gestation" to occur earlier. However, an individual woman bonding with a wanted fetus is very
different from the state re-interpreting the time-line of pregnancy to view "late gestation" as occurring
before the midpoint. Moreover, the woman's viewpoint naturally focuses more on changes in her body
than on milestones created by medical advances. Hence, although the Court in Roe was correct in
asserting that physicians are not interested in quickening, 410 U.S. at 160, perhaps the Court "over-
medicalized" pregnancy through its too ready dismissal of quickening. Pregnant women undoubtedly
are more interested in quickening (which occurs between weeks 17 and 20), than they are in the
threshold of viability. Indeed most women are probably unaware of when their fetus has crossed this
threshold. See M. HARRISON, M. GoLBus & R. FILLY, supra note 117, at 19 (abortions for genetic
defects cause less psychological trauma when performed before quickening). It similarly would be
medically presumptuous to believe that technological advances could so radically alter women's views
about when late gestation begins.
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would be highly unlikely for a pregnant woman, questions of abortion
aside, to consider "late gestation" as occurring earlier than the mid-point
of pregnancy (week 20) or for persons who support some right to abortion
to feel that, before this time, a fetus is virtually indistinguishable from a
baby. Thus, even if the threshold of viability changes, refusing to allow
states to proscribe abortion much earlier than the current cut-off would
not encroach on the ability of states to prohibit infanticide or abortions
that are uncomfortably similar to it, because the public's perception of
"late gestation" probably would not have changed. 90
Of course, regardless of how fetal development is perceived, abortions
performed after the fetuses could survive ex utero may lead to tragic situa-
tions where unexpected survivals result in neurologically damaged chil-
dren. As long as abortions are performed in a manner that does not pre-
clude live births, avoiding such harms supports the idea that the abortion
cut-off could follow viability if it were to occur earlier in gestation. Neo-
natal care technology is not the only relevant concern here, however.
Technological viability must be balanced against the woman's right to
abort for a substantial time in pregnancy and, of course, her right to have
the procedure done in the manner safest for her." 1 If major abdominal
surgery could remove an embryo prior to 8 weeks in such a way that it
could be transplanted to another woman's womb, women could not be
required to submit to this risky procedure rather than having a safe and
simple suction curettage. Dilatation and evacuation has become the most
common and safest abortion method through week 20 and is being used by
some doctors a few weeks later than this.1 92 The increasing use of this
method is significant in several ways. First, it shows that even in the ex-
190. Michael Perry, who argues that the ethical function of substantive due process is to ascertain
and incorporate evolving societal beliefs and ideals into the law, supports the Roe standard on the
ground that "conventional moral sensibilities appear to hold that a postviability abortion is more like
infanticide than contraception. . . ." Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The
Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689, 734-36 (1976). Conventional
moral sensibilities, in turn, are tied far more intimately to how pregnancy is felt and viewed than to
the latest developments in neonatal intensive care.
191. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 317, 397-401 (1979) (holding void for vagueness
requirement that physician use abortion technique giving fetus best opportunity for live birth unless
different technique necessary to preserve woman's life, and suggesting that statute appeared to imper-
missibly require physician to make "trade-offs" between woman's health and additional chances of
fetal survival); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 54, 77-79 (invalidating statute that
appeared to ban second trimester saline abortions despite their safety). After viability, if two methods
are equally safe for the woman, the state constitutionally can require that the one least hazardous for
the fetus be used. The constitutionality of such a provision, contained in Missouri law, see Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.030 (Vernon 1983), was upheld by the Eighth Circuit and not challenged on appeal. See
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 862-63 (8th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part,
vacated in part, remanded, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
192. See Grimes, Second-Trimester Abortions in the United States, 16 FAM. PLAN. PRSPS. 260,
263 (1984) (D & E has lower mortality rate than instillation methods throughout second trimester,
although at 21 or more weeks difference is small).
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ceedingly unlikely event that the threshold of viability becomes week 19,
abortions need not be restricted in deference to the problem of live births
earlier than week 20 or 21. Second, if the method comes to be used even a
few weeks later, it raises the question of how to proceed if a feticidal
method of abortion is safer for the woman than childbirth even after the
time the fetus is viable.
Now that abortion even after week 21 is safer than childbirth, it could
be argued that any time abortion is safer, it must be made available, be-
cause the state cannot impose undesired health risks on a woman. Letting
technology control in this manner is, however, the corollary of following
survivability wherever it might lead. Just as following survivability could
erode the abortion right, requiring that abortion be allowed whenever it is
statistically safer than childbirth could lead to the disquieting conclusion
that a woman has a right to choose a lethal mode of childbirth, such as
craniotomy," 3 if this reduction in fetal head size affords her a slight sta-
tistical increase in safety. An absolutist stance in regard to letting the wo-
man decide whether to undergo health risks might be warranted when the
issue is the affirmative state imposition of such risks-e.g., requiring her
to deliver by Cesarean in cases where vaginal delivery is hazardous to the
baby.194 When the issue is how late in pregnancy abortions must be made
available, however, technology and statistical variations in safety should
not completely control. Thus, were abortion to become safer than child-
birth through week 32, this would not mandate that it be permitted until
then. But recognizing that the relative levels of safety are not conclusive in
establishing a time frame does not mean that this factor is irrelevant or
that the fact that virtually all second trimester abortions are now safer
than childbirth can be ignored. Rather, this fact should increase the bur-
den on those who would circumscribe the abortion right significantly more
than it is today.
Another important consideration is that whatever cut-off point is chosen
will affect the availability of abortions immediately prior to the cut-off.
Although gestational age is easier to estimate in utero than is viability, as
noted previously, estimates of gestational age can still be inaccurate by
plus or minus about eleven days. Because of this, doctors often refuse to
perform abortions even for women whose pregnancy appears to be a week
193. Craniotomy is the surgical perforation and compression of the cranium of a fetus 
in order to
reduce its head size. ILLUSTRATED STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 334 (24th 
ed. 1982). It is
done when natural delivery is impossible, id., or when the fetus has died in utero. 
SCHMIDT'S AT-
TORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER C-253 (1982).
194. A few courts have imposed Cesareans on unwilling women so as to save the 
fetus. See, e.g.,
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981). 
For a cogent
criticism of this case, see Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest 
Cut of All, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., June 1982, at 16.
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or two less advanced than the upper limits. 95 Although recognition of this
impact on earlier abortions does not suggest any particular cut-off, it does
indicate that in practice any cut-off will be somewhat more conservative
than it looks. Because it would be surprising if the Court, given its em-
phasis on the fundamental nature of the woman's right to abortion, would
find this right adequately protected if it could be exercised for less than
half of pregnancy, the negative impact of any cut-off on earlier abortions
justifies a reluctance to let fetal viability set the abortion limit if fetuses
ever become viable earlier than week 22.
Finally, looking not to women in general but to those particular women
most likely to seek late abortions, two groups warrant particular concern:
those facing diagnoses of fetal defects, and the very young. As will be
discussed below, some fetal defects are unexpectedly discovered later than
the standard time for genetic diagnoses. A few of these may merit special
treatment no matter where the elective abortion cut-off is set. But the time
frame in which fetal defects are typically diagnosed is nonetheless relevant
to determining the general cut-off. The current method of screening for
genetic defects is amniocentesis, a procedure that involves removal and
culture of fluid from the amniotic sac." 8 The cultured cells can be tested
for a number of identifiable anomalies.1 97  Because successful amni-
ocentesis requires sufficient amniotic fluid, it is typically performed at ap-
proximately week 16 of pregnancy. 8 Test results are available three to
four weeks later.1 99 Hence abortions for fetal defects, or eugenic abor-
tions,200 are most often performed between weeks 19 and 22,201 and some-
times involve fetuses that are approaching the threshold of viability.202
195. If 24 weeks is the limit, doctors will look to the mean head size (in terms of biparietal
diameter) at 24 weeks. However, because of variations in growth rate, in order to avoid aborting
fetuses that actually are 25z weeks, physicians may also exclude from abortion some women whose
pregnancies have progressed only to week 22 . See Stubblefield, supra note 105, at 791.
196. In the laboratory, the amniotic fluid is mixed with nutrient-containing tissue-culture fluid
and maintained in an incubator at human body temperature so that fetal cells can grow. Karp, The
Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 458, 459 (T. Mappes & J. Zembaty
eds. 1981).
197. Omenn, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disorders, 200 Scs. 952, 954-55 (1978). The amni-
otic fluid itself is analyzed for evidence of neural tube defects. Karp, supra note 196, at 461.
198. M. HARRISON, M. GoLaus & R. FILLY, supra note 117, at 19.
199. Omenn, supra note 197, at 952.
200. The term "eugenic abortion" is more correct than "genetic abortion," because some fetaldefects may not be of genetic origin but may instead be caused by maternal illness (e.g., rubella), or
drugs given the mother (e.g., thalidomide), or by unknown factors (e.g., fetal hydrocephalus not asso-
ciated with other anomalies). See Note, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe v.Wade: How
Viable is Roe's Viability Standard?, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 113, 125 n.73 (1983).
201. According to one physician, the average time at which abortions after amniocentesis are per-
formed is 22 weeks. Interview with Dr. Harold Schulman, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology,
Albert Einstein College of Medicine, in New York City (Apr. 7, 1983).
202. Fletcher, The Morality and Ethics of Prenatal Diagnosis, in GENEIrc DISORDERS AND
THE FErUs 621, 628 (A. Milunsky ed. 1979).
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New technology will soon affect this discussion to some extent. Chori-
onic villi biopsy is a new, and still experimental, technique of genetic di-
agnosis that is performed in the first trimester between approximately
week 8 and week 12.203 When this new technique becomes standard, it
will eliminate many of the abortions now performed after amniocentesis,
which already constitute a very small number of abortions.
204 However,
this technique is unlikely to completely replace amniocentesis. Some high-
risk women 205 will not obtain prenatal care early enough to have chori-
onic villi biopsy performed. Moreover, certain defects, such as
anencephaly or spina bifida, cannot be diagnosed by this new test and
hence still require amniocentesis. 20 6 Thus the amniocentesis time frame
will remain relevant even after this new technique has become routine.
Although the actual number of eugenic abortions is small, these are
cases where the justification for abortion is unusually strong and the pub-
lic support solid.207 The Court has not discussed eugenic abortions specifi-
cally, but it is highly unlikely that it would sanction an abortion cut-off
that precluded them.208 Given the difficulties of precise determination of
gestational age, and the fact that there can be some slippage in the time of
203. See generally Pergament, Ginsberg, Verlinsky, Cadkinchu & Trinka, and Grebner, Wapner,
Barr & Jackson, Prenatal Tay-Sachs Diagnosis by Chorionic Villi Sampling (Letters to the Editor),
1983 THE LANCET 286-87 (reporting that chorionic villi sampling has been used successfully to
diagnose Tay-Sachs disease in first trimester of pregnancy).
204. Grimes, supra note 192, at 261.
205. Prenatal testing is routinely recommended only for women over 35, women who have previ-
ously had a disabled child, or women who have other risk factors such as genetic disorders in one
partner's family. See G. BURROW & T. FERRIS, MEDICAL COMPLICATIONS DURING PREGNANCY
129 (2d ed. 1982).
206. Because abnormalities in the amniotic fluid, rather than chromosomal anomalies, indicate
neural tube defects, chorionic villi biopsy cannot be used to test for neural tube defects. Interview 
with
Dr. Philip Darney, Associate Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, and Reproductive Sciences,
University of California, San Francisco, California, in New York City (Sept. 15, 1983).
207. See Thompson, Prenatal Diagnosis and Public Policy, in GENETIC DISORDERS AND THE
FETUS 637, 644 (A. Milunsky ed. 1979) (80% public approval where there is strong chance of serious
defect) (citing National Opinion Research Center, Limited Approval of Legal Abortion, 4 CURRENT
OPINION 18 (1976)). For a more recent survey, see Louis Harris & Associates, Public Attitudes
About Sex Education, Family Planning, and Abortion in the United States 49 (1985) (64% of persons
polled would oppose abortion ban if fetus defective) (unpublished survey) (on file with author). At the
time of Roe, 14 states had patterned their statutes after the A.L.I.'s MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 230.3
(Proposed Official Draft 1962), which allowed abortion with no time restrictions if pregnancy 
re-
sulted from rape or incest, if the mother's life was in danger, or if the child would be mentally
retarded or physicially defective. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 n.37. Of the first eleven states adopting the
A.L.I. provisions, only California chose to exclude the A.L.I.'s provision on fetal defects. See 
Note,
supra note 200, at 121-22. It is ironic that Roe is more restrictive of eugenic abortions than were
these older state statutes. See id. at 124-25. It is even more ironic that as more defects become 
suscep-
tible to prenatal diagnosis, the threshold of viability is dropping, rendering abortion problematic 
if the
fetal diagnosis is made a few weeks later than usual.
208. At the time of Roe, results from amniocentesis were readily obtained before viability, which
was ordinarily at about 28 weeks. Thus, although it was perhaps ironic that Roe was stricter 
in
regard to eugenic abortions than the Georgia statute invalidated by the Court in Doe v. Bolton, 
410




performing amniocentesis, obtaining the results, and scheduling the abor-
tion, if most abortions after amniocentesis are to be kept within the frame-
work of general elective abortions, then states should not be allowed to
prohibit abortion until about week 22.
The other group most likely to seek late abortions is young teenagers,
who may have irregular menstrual periods that make pregnancy harder to
detect, may deny the pregnancy until it is too obvious to ignore, or may be
afraid to tell their parents or seek medical care.209 Moreover, highly edu-
cated women tend to have earlier abortions,210 and late abortion candi-
dates may often be poor and uneducated, as well as young. The Court has
allowed states to further disadvantage poor women by treating abortion
differently from other medical procedures and refusing to fund it.2 1' Even
if one finds such refusal to fund justified, the state cut-off for elective
abortions should not work to the detriment of those women (or girls) least
able to cope with unwanted pregnancy, childbirth, and childrearing. Even
young and uneducated teenagers will have difficulty denying the fact of
their pregnancy when they begin to feel the fetus move, which occurs be-
tween 17 and 20 weeks. Allowing time after this for persons unfamiliar
with the health care system to gain access to it again suggests that the
week 20-24 time period is significant, and that the cut-off should cer-
tainly never become earlier than week 21 to 22.212
It might be objected that although these medical, psychological and so-
cial factors are relevant to legislative decision making, they lack constitu-
tional import. But if protecting women's privacy rights for a substantial
portion of pregnancy is a legitimate judicial function, then defining the
lower limit of "substantial" is as well. We have seen the futility of seeking
biological or logical justifications for lines drawn in the continuum of
pregnancy. Thus any line-drawing must be based on less absolute, but no
less important, factors such as medical, psychological and social condi-
209. See Grimes, Second-Trimester Abortions in the United States, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 260,
261 (1984) (nearly 1 in 4 abortions on girls under 15 performed in second trimester).
210. Id. at 262.
211. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). For criticism ofthe Court's approach, see Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amend-
ment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113 (1980). Some scholarshave argued that cut-offs prohibiting abortions are very different in nature from the mere refusal tofund abortions. See Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of theAbortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 721, 736-37 (1981) (supporting distinction between negative right to obtain abortionwithout state interference and positive one to have abortion paid for by government). But see L.TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTIONAL LAW 933 n.77 (1978) (arguing that funding cases do not restupon any principled distinction between governmental interference through prohibition and similar
interference through selective funding).
212. Interestingly, the A.L.I.'s Model Penal Code also excepted from the criminal prohibition of
abortions those performed on girls under the age of 16 who had had illicit intercourse (all intercourse
outside marriage is illicit at this age). MOnEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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tions. Of course, these conditions may someday change. For example,
were a safe, inexpensive and effective first trimester abortifacient devel-
oped that could be purchased over the counter and ingested, the need for
late abortions would decline substantially. But given the social conditions
in this country today2"' and for the foreseeable future, even if the thresh-
old of viability moves earlier in gestation, the point at which states can
prohibit elective abortions should remain approximately what it is today,
and in no event should it creep earlier than the week 21-24 range.
C. Eugenic Abortions
Although most fetal defects will be diagnosed within the amniocentesis
time frame described earlier, a few will unexpectedly be discovered later.
A small percentage of these will be cases in which the amniocentesis had
to be repeated.214 More significantly, while only a fairly small group of
pregnant women-those considered to be at high risk-at present are rou-
tinely offered amniocentesis, 215 other obstetric procedures which can be
performed throughout pregnancy, such as ultrasonography, are playing an
increasingly important role in the diagnosis of fetal abnormalities.
216
Hence a woman may complain, late in pregnancy, of an absence of fetal
movement, and the ultrasound may show that the fetus is anencephalic,
i.e., lacks a higher brain. 1' Or an ultrasound done at week 20 or 24 in a
woman who had no prenatal genetic testing may show an unusual fetal
appearance, with subsequent amniocentesis indicating a genetic disorder.
Additionally, certain fetal problems such as hydrocephalus (water on the
213. Conditions elsewhere may make different limits workable. For example, Sweden has a gen-
eral cut-off of 18 weeks. See C. TIETzE, supra note 9, at 10. It should be noted that Sweden, how-
ever, has universal access to medical care, virtually no poverty, and a very high general level of
education. Cf Young, Caring for Disabled Infants, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1983, at 
15,
16-17. Sex education also makes a difference. A recent study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute shows
that the U.S. has a higher level of teenage pregnancies than other developed countries, and suggests
that, among other things, the more frank and open sex education in other countries, their lower
poverty rates, and their more generous provision of free or low-cost contraceptives may be contributing
factors. Jones, Forrest, Goldman, Henshaw, Lincoln, Rosoff, Westoff & Wulf, Teenage Pregnancy in
Developed Countries: Determinants and Policy Implications, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 53, 53-54,
58-60 (1985).
214. Although a culture is successfully grown in 98% of the cases, in the remaining 2% a second
amniocentesis is required. NATIONAL INST. OF CHILD HEALTH & HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, at 1-35 (1979).
215. See supra note 205, for the indications for amniocentesis.
216. See M. HARRISON, M. GOLBUS & R. FILLY, supra note 117, at 145-47 (many fetal malfor-
mations detected serendipitously during ultrasonographic examinations performed for obstetric indica-
tions); Ferry & Pernoll, Rational Management of Perinatal Hydrocephalus, 126 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 151, 151 (1976) (fetal hydrocephalus likely to be discovered more frequently with use
of ultrasound during pregnancy).
217. See generally Nakano, Anencephaly: A Review, 15 DEVEL. MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY
383 (1973). Anencephaly is sometimes diagnosed late in pregnancy by the absence of voluntary move-
ment by an anencephalic fetus. See Bonanao, Gregori & Breen, Anencephaly: An Overview, 77 J.
MED. SoC'Y N.J. 439, 440 (1980).
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brain) may require a series of ultrasound examinations to determine with
reasonable accuracy the severity of the problem.218 It is therefore neces-
sary to consider, regardless of any change in the elective abortion cut-off,
whether abortion under these unusual circumstances should be treated ex-
actly like elective abortion, or should instead be given special treatment.
Some commentators have suggested that because an unfavorable diagno-
sis is extremely disturbing to the mother-to-be, eugenic abortions can be
considered therapeutic, i.e., undertaken to preserve the woman's health.219
Although the woman's trauma should not be minimized, I believe this
approach is flawed. First, although several cases have indicated that
"health" in the abortion context includes mental health,22° and the Court
has refused to interpret "health" narrowly,221 physicians do not generally
interpret "health" to cover maternal trauma resulting from knowledge of
a fetal defect. Because doctors, reasonably enough, seldom wish to create
test cases for homicide prosecutions, few if any will perform eugenic abor-
tions (except for defects incompatible with life, such as anencephaly) after
week 24 or 25.222 Second, even if "health" were properly interpreted in
this manner,22 only some women facing severe fetal diagnoses would
218. See Johnson, Pretorius, Clewell, Meier & Manchester, Fetal Hydrocephalus: Diagnosis and
Management, 7 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLoGY 83, 85 (1983) (single ultrasound examination forhydrocephalus often inconclusive); Vintzileos, Ingardia & Nochimson, Congenital Hydrocephalus: A
Review and Protocol for Perinatal Management, 62 Oas-TRics & GYNECOLOGY 539, 542 (1983)
(ultrasonography does not always provide early diagnosis of hydrocephalus).
219. See Survey of Abortion Law, supra note 8, at 148-49; Wood & Hawkins, State Regulation
of Late Abortion and the Physician's Duty of Care to the Viable Fetus, 45 Mo. L. REv. 394, 415-16
(1980) (recognizing that Supreme Court dicta suggest that states may not prohibit post-viability abor-
tions for woman whose mental health was impaired by diagnosis of fetal defect).
220. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192; United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971).
221. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400 (noting, in invalidating state requirement that doctor use abor-
tion technique best for fetal survival unless alternative is necessary to safeguard the woman's health,that 'health' had not been construed by Pennsylvania courts to mean that all factors relevant to wo-
man's welfare may be considered).
222. At a Planned Parenthood conference in New York on December 14 and 15, 1984, several
noted physicians said that although they would perform third trimester abortions for anencephaly andfelt that other very severe defects warranted late termination, they felt constrained to deny late abor-tions to women where the diagnosis was a severe but not invariably lethal abnormality. Statements of
Dr. Mitchell Golbus, Professor of Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproductive Science, and Director ofthe Reproductive Genetics Unit at the University of California Medical Center, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, and Dr. Phillip Stubblefield, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Harvard Medical
School, Boston, Massachusetts. Dr. Stubblefield stated this view earlier in an interview in Boston onJune 6, 1983. Also at the Planned Parenthood conference, Dr. Louise Tyrer, Director of the Medical
Division of Planned Parenthood, stated that she has been unable to locate physicians in this country
willing to perform abortions after week 25 even for such serious genetic defects as Trisomy 13 or 18,
and has advised women in such cases to seek medical care in other countries. Although the numerous
states without abortion legislation (and hence no restriction of post-viability abortion to cases wherethe woman's health is at stake) present no legal impediment to such abortions, they are nonetheless,
according to Dr. Tyrer, virtually impossible to obtain.
223. Even if "health" were so interpreted, this would be of little use in those states that require
that post-viability abortions to preserve the woman's health be done by the method least likely toharm the fetus. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16 -12 -141(c) (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-329, 28-330 (1979). When abortion is performed because of a fetal defect, the intent is that the fetus not
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merit abortions; abortions could properly be denied to women who were
handling this tragedy relatively well.224 (Of course, if mental health were
really the only relevant factor, this disparity would seem neither inappro-
priate nor odd.) Finally, and most importantly, calling eugenic abortions
"therapeutic" is not completely honest. Mental disturbance alone would
seem an inadequate justification for some post-viability abortions-for ex-
ample, if a woman were horribly disturbed to find that the fetus was male
or had a very mild genetic abnormality that did little more than slightly
decrease stature.225 One feels far more sympathy for the woman whose
mental disturbance is created by a truly severe diagnosis. In other words,
the real question here is whether fetuses with genetic anomalies can be
treated differently from normal ones of the same gestational age. This
vexing question clearly resembles the agonizing problem of whether
newborns with birth defects can be allowed to die-a problem for which
analysis properly focuses on the severity of the infant's condition, and not
on the impact of the baby's condition on its parents.
226
To analyze this problem, let's start with the easiest case. Suppose, at
week 28, an ultrasound is performed because the woman feels no fetal
movement, and it reveals that the fetus is anencephalic. Such infants, if
not stillborn, will die within hours or days of birth.
22 Even in the ex-
traordinarily rare case where the baby lives a bit longer,
228 there is no
possibility of lengthy survival or consciousness. Upon diagnosis at birth,
withholding life-sustaining treatment is unquestionably appropriate, be-
cause the infant is dying.
2 9 Even the very conservative "Baby Doe" regu-
lations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) allowed nontreatment of anencephalic infants.
230 Because such
survive. Such a requirement would therefore effectively eliminate such abortions. See Note, supra note
200, at 135-36.
224. Survey of Abortion Law, supra note 8, at 148-49.
225. For example, Klinefelter's syndrome (an extra X chromosome in males) causes infertility
and a slightly decreased I.Q.-10 to 15 points below that of normal siblings. D. SMITH, RECOGNIZA-
BLE PATTERNS OF HUMAN MALFORMATION 64 (3d ed. 1982). Counseling parents about whether to
abort for such an abnormality can be quite difficult. See P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL
POLICY 166 (1977).
226. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 
AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO 
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
219 (1983) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION'S REPORT].
227. See Nakano, supra note 217, at 383.
228. The longest documented survival for an anencephalic infant is 5 months. Chervenak, When
Is Termination of Pregnancy During the Third Trimester Morally Justifiable?, 310 N. ENG. 
J.
MED. 501, 502 (1984); Brackbill, The Role of the Cortex in Orienting: Orienting Reflex 
in an
Anencephalic Human Infant, 5 DEv. PSYCHOLOGY 195 (1971).
229. See, e.g., COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 226, at 219; D. SMrT, supra note 225, at
568.
230. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1654 (1984) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. C (1984). This was the
final version of the "Baby Doe" regulations, promulgated under the ostensible authority of § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Federal courts have held, however, that the
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an infant is dying at birth, and is hence not viable, an anencephalic fetus
is likewise not viable, no matter what stage of gestation it has reached. 231
Denying a woman an abortion in this type of case is tantamount to mak-
ing her carry to term a fetus that has died in utero. Thus, even under a
viability standard that brooks no exceptions, abortion for anencephaly (or
other defects that inevitably cause neonatal death)23 2 should be permitted
at any time in pregnancy.
Most defects, however, are not quite so severe, and hence create far
more difficult dilemmas. For instance, Trisomy 1323 or 18234 infants al-
most never live beyond three years. 285 Those few who survive infancy are
inevitably profoundly retarded 23 6 and usually plagued by multiple physi-
cal problems. 237 Tay-Sachs"8 children never survive past four years and
suffer a painful process of neurological deterioration beginning at about
six months.2 "9 Babies with these sorts of defects present true treatment
department lacked statutory authority to promulgate such regulations. United States v. University
Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 729 F.2d 144
(2d Cir. 1984); American Hosp. Assoc. v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), afftd, Nos.
84-6211 & 84-6231 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985). Congress has nowpassed amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to deal with the problem of
infants with birth defects. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 1752-54 (1984).
231. Although not using the terminology of viability, Chervenak persuasively argues in favor of
third trimester abortions for anencephalic infants, because they have a reliably diagnosable condition
that is incompatible with postnatal survival for more than a few weeks. Chervenak, supra note 228, at
502.
232. Certain defects, such as renal agenesis, infantile polycystic kidneys with hypoplastic lungs,
and Meckel's syndrome, inevitably cause death within a few weeks of birth, but at present are not
susceptible to accurate prenatal diagnosis. Chervenak, supra note 228, at 502. Hydranencephaly, a
disorder related to anencephaly in which the cerebellum is destroyed prenatally, can allow for a some-
what longer life (6 months or a year), but these infants will never be conscious. See S. KORONES,
HIGH RIsK NEWBORN INFANTS 165 (3d ed. 1981). Prenatal diagnoses of hydranencephaly or alobar
holoprosencephaly (another disorder incompatible with long-term or conscious survival) are treated
similarly to anencephaly after birth, D. SMITH, supra note 225, at 568, and should probably be
treated similarly when diagnosed in utero, assuming such diagnosis is reliable. Chervenak, supra note228, at 503, notes, however, that in utero diagnoses of these disorders are sometimes unreliable.
233. Trisomy 13 is a chromosomal anomaly that causes severely abnormal cerebral function and
often causes anomalies of the eyes, ears, heart, renal system, and gastrointestinal tract. See Magenis &
Hecht, Chromosome 13 Trisomy Syndrome, in BIRTH DEFECTS COMPENDIUM 212, 212-13 (D.
Bergsma 2d ed. 1979).
234. Trisomy 18 causes severely abnormal cerebral function, and, frequently, cardiac, gastrointes-
tinal or renal defects, or defects of other organ systems. See Hecht, Chromosome 18 Trisomy Syn-
drome, in BIRTH DEFECTS COMPENDIUM, supra note 233, at 201-02.
235. Sixty-five percent of Trisomy 13 infants are dead by 3 months, and 95% are dead by 3 years.
Magenis & Hecht, supra note 233, at 213. Trisomy 18 infants fare no better. 90% are dead within
the first year. Karayalcin, Wilms Tumor in a Thirteen Year Old Girl with Trisomy 18 (Letter to the
Editor), 135 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 665, 666 (1982).
236. Magenis & Hecht, supra note 233, at 213; Hecht, supra note 234, at 202. There is no
report of a child with Trisomy 18 ever learning to walk or talk. Id.
237. See supra notes 233-34.
238. Tay-Sachs is a degenerative disease in which the baby appears normal at birth but develops
motor weakness and becomes unconscious by no later than age four. See O'Brien, The Gangliosidoses,
in THE METABOLIC BASIS OF INHERITED DISEASE 945, 957 (J. Stanbury, J. Wyngaarden, D. Fred-
rickson, J. Goldstein & M. Brown 5th ed. 1983).
239. Id. at 852-53.
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dilemmas, discussion of which is largely beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.240 However, the overwhelming majority of physicians would not ag-
gressively sustain the life of a Trisomy 13 or 18 infant,
241 or a child with
Tay-Sachs, after some point in its inevitable decline.
24 2 Ethicists who spe-
cifically discuss these disorders also agree that they render life so brief and
so devastatingly impaired that medical preservation would do more harm
than good.243 Of course, there is dispute here: DHHS's "Baby Doe" regu-
lations seemed to require preservation of any conscious life that could per-
sist for more than hours or days.
244 But if one rejects such rigid vitalism
245
and allows that some few lives are so painful and/or limited that death
could reasonably be preferred, these infants' lives may well be of this
caliber.
Babies with these sorts of defects will therefore be appropriate candi-
240. For discussions of these issues, see generally R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT 
OF
HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS (1984); COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 226, at 197-229; Arras, 
To-
ward an Ethic of Ambiguity, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1984, at 25; WHICH BABIES SHALL
LIVE? HUMANISTIC DIMENSIONS OF THE CARE OF IMPERILED NEWBORNS 
(T. Murray & A.
Caplan eds. 1985); Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life
Counts, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283 (1985).
241. A survey of pediatricians and pediatric surgeons found that 91.6 percent of the pediatricians
and 86.5 percent of the surgeons would acquiesce in the parents' decision not to repair an atresia 
in a
Trisomy 13 infant. Shaw, Randolph & Manard, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National
Survey of Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588, 590 (1977). This was 
higher
than for any other disorder except anencephaly. Dr. David Smith specifically recommends 
giving
parents the option to withhold treatment from these infants. D. SMITH, supra note 225, at 568; see
also Duff, Counselling Families in Deciding Care of Severely Defective Children: A Way of 
Coping
With 'Medical Vietnam,' 67 PEDIATRICS 315 (1981) (most parents and health care personnel
unenthusiastic about treating infants with Trisomy 18 or disorders with equally poor prognosis). 
No
physician I have interviewed would recommend surgery for a Trisomy 13 or 18 infant with 
es-
ophageal atresia. Personal interviews with Dr. Alan Fleischman, Director of Division of Neonatology,
Dept. of Pediatrics, and Associate Professor of Pediatrics, Albert Einstein College of Medicine; 
Dr.
Harry Gordon, Professor Emeritus of Pediatrics, Albert Einstein College of Medicine; Dr. Lucille
Perrotta, Director of Newborn Services, Hospital of Albert Einstein College of Medicine, in 
New
York City (June 11 & 12, 1984); Dr. Jack Rudolph, Director of Newborn Services and Prof. 
of
Pediatrics & Obstetrics/Gynecology, University of Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, 
Texas.
(Feb. 19, 1985); Dr. Joan Richardson, Director of Newborn Intensive Care and Professor of 
Pediat-
rics and Obstetrics/Gynecology, University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston in Galveston, 
Texas
(Feb. 5, 1985).
242. See Desnick & Goldberg, Tay-Sachs Disease: Prospects for Therapeutic Intervention, 
18
PROGRESS CLINICAL BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 129, 136-38 (1977) (no treatment for Tay-Sachs 
avail-
able or likely to be developed soon).
243. See e.g., R. WEIR, supra note 240, at 235-38; Strong, Can Fluids and Electrolytes Be
'Extraordinary' Treatment, 7 J. MED. ETHICS 83, 85 (1981); Arras, supra note 240, at 31.
244. DHHS took the position that handicapped infants must be provided with all treatments
given normal infants, that procedures are mandatory unless they are not "medically beneficial," 
and
that factors such as future impairments are irrelevant. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55, pt. 84, app. C (1984). For
criticisms of this position, see Angell, Handicapped Children: Baby Doe and Uncle Sam, 309 
N.
ENG. J. MED. 659, 659-61 (1983); Paris, Terminating Treatment for Newborns: A Theological 
Per-
spective, 10 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 120, 122 (1982); Arras, supra note 240, at 26-27;
Rhoden, supra note 240, at 216-22.
245. The principle that any sort of life at all is preferable to nonexistence and must therefore 
be
preserved by all medical means has been termed "vitalism." See McCormick, To Save or Let 
Die, 229
J. A.M.A. 172, 175 (1974).
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dates for "conservative" medical treatment, such as withholding surgery,
resuscitation, antibiotics for infection, and perhaps even artificial modes of
feeding. 2" In light of this, it would seem reasonable for abortion, even
past the usual cut-off, to be permissible for similarly afflicted fetuses, on
the theory that if post-natal life supports can be withheld or withdrawn,
then so can prenatal life supports. After all, the woman's privacy right
continues throughout pregnancy. Although the state's interest in the po-
tential life normally becomes compelling at viability, and hence can over-
ride her right, in cases where the child's life will be so brief, painful and
bleak that aggressive treatment of the infant should not be mandatory, it
seems reasonable to hold that before birth, the state's interest in potential
life is likewise less strong. The state, therefore, should not force women to
bear children that inevitably will struggle, suffer and soon die, and doctors
should have discretion to perform these abortions substantially later than
elective ones (though probably not quite as late as for anencephaly).
The hardest cases, and the ones in which the argument that the woman
should have a right to abort substantially beyond the usual cut-off is least
persuasive, are defects such as Down's syndrome 247 or spina bifida,248 in
which most victims can live an impaired but lengthy and happy life. The
state interest in protecting a newborn with such a defect is generally held
to supersede parental or medical discretion to deny treatment to the
child 2 49 unless, for example, a spina bifida infant has associated anomalies
which are unusually severe.250 Thus, continued life is ordinarily felt to be
246. See R. WEIR, supra note 240, at 234-40; COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 226, at
249-51 (discussing resuscitation), 220 (discussing methods of feeding); Strong, Defective Infants and
Their Impact On Families: Ethical and Legal Considerations, 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 168
(1983).
247. Down's syndrome, or Trisomy 21, is a genetic abnormality that causes varying degrees of
mental retardation and can be accompanied by other medical disorders. See Miller, Chromosome 21
Trisomy Syndrome, in BIRTH DEFECTS COMPENDIUM, supra note 233, at 215-16. Many of these
children can live relatively lengthy lives. Id.
248. Spina bifida, in which the neural tube fails to close, requires an operation at birth to repair
the spinal lesion. Depending on the severity of the defect, spina bifida children may suffer from
paralysis of bowel, bladder and legs, may require numerous orthopedic surgeries for spinal deformi-
ties, and may need shunting for hydrocephalus. See Lorber, Spina Bifida Cystica, 47 ARCHIVES DIS-
EASE IN CHILDHOOD 854 (1972). Some may be mentally retarded, but others are of normal intelli-
gence. G. AVERY, supra note 105, at 981-82.
249. In the case of Baby Doe, the Indiana state courts refused to intervene in a parental decision
to withhold surgery from a Down's syndrome baby with an esophageal blockage. In re Infant Doe,
No. GU 8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct. Ind. April 12, 1982), writ of mandamus dismissed sub
nom. State ex rel Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 § 140 (Ind. Ct. App. May 27, 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 961 (1983). Most authorities agree, however, that Down's syndrome babies should be
treated like normal infants. See, e.g., COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 226, at 218-19; Fost, Put-
ting Hospitals on Notice, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1982, at 5; Paris & McCormick, Saving
Defective Infants: Options for Life or Death, AMERIcA, April 23, 1983, at 313.
250. In the case of Baby Jane Doe, an infant with severe spina bifida, hydrocephalus, and micro-
cephaly, the parental decision to choose "conservative treatment" with antibiotics over surgical closing
of the spinal lesion was upheld, although the Court of Appeals' decision was based primarily on the
procedural ground that there had been no compliance with the Family Court Act's neglect procedures.
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in the best interests of these infants. In light of this assessment, abortion of
a fetus with Down's syndrome or spina bifida can seldom be characterized
as being best for the child. Rather, it is usually undertaken because par-
ents do not wish to raise such a child, since raising a handicapped child
often destroys marriages, disrupts careers and creates problems for sib-
lings.251 Although the vast majority of women who receive a prenatal di-
agnosis of Down's syndrome or spina bifida do abort,
2 52 an unusually late
diagnosis of this type of defect nonetheless presents a very difficult ques-
tion for late eugenic abortions.
These cases are further complicated by the fact that a late abortion may
produce a living infant. Although this is unlikely with defects such as
Trisomy 13 or 18, where the fetus is so fragile that it is not likely to
survive a substantially premature delivery, premature Down's syndrome
and spina bifida infants may be as strong as healthy premature babies and
will face only the usual risks of prematurity. Doctors have ethical and
legal obligations to treat the handicapped baby born alive from an abor-
tion like any other infant with a similar handicap.
25 Thus, the risk of live
birth of a baby with defects who is made to suffer even further from the
hazards of prematurity provides a good reason not to authorize such late
abortions. But even if in utero death were assured,
2
M late abortions for
these defects pose ethical problems as well. The 8-month Down's syn-
drome fetus differs from the normal fetus only in its cognitive potential.
Although its deficiency may warrant some relaxation of the normal cut-off
(e.g., 26 weeks instead of 24, or 24 instead of 22), the deficiency does not
justify the time restrictions' complete abrogation; this would imply that
the state has little or no interest in protecting an unborn individual simply
because it is handicapped. 55
The problem of eugenic abortions thus cannot be resolved either by
simply treating them like ordinary elective abortions or by allowing termi-
nation for any defect throughout the entire third trimester. There exists a
frightening array of potential defects, and the law obviously cannot set
specific time limits for each one. However, flexible guidelines could be
Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983), affg 95
A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1983) (dismissing petition by unrelated party to compel surgery). In
refusing the federal government's request to intervene, the New York federal district court found that
the parents were acting upon "a reasonable interpretation of the child's best interests." United States
v. University Hospital of State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 575 F. Supp. 607, 616 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), affd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
251. See Strong, supra note 246.
252. Kerenyi & Chitkara, Letter to the Editor, in 305 N. ENG. J. MED. 1219 (1981).
253. See Rhoden, supra note 146, at 1489.
254. As noted previously, some doctors now advocate injecting Digoxin into the hearts of fetuses
being aborted, to insure fetal death in utero. See Waters, supra note 149.
255. But see Note, supra note 200, at 119-20, 137 (arguing for completely unfettered right to
eugenic abortion at any time in pregnancy).
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established that permitted eugenic abortions for a few weeks after the nor-
mal cut-off, abortions for extremely severe defects (e.g., Trisomy 13) quite
a bit later, and abortions for defects incompatible with life (e.g.,
anencephaly) at any time during pregnancy. With disorders in which se-
verity can vary enormously such as microcephaly and hydrocephalus, phy-
sicians would have the task of assessing how severe the defect was likely to
be, and thus how much past the ordinary cut-off abortion was justifia-
ble.256 No solution to this infrequent but vexing problem will be perfect,
but a flexible one such as this seems preferable.
Because states can require post-viability abortions to be performed by
the method least harmful to the fetus unless an alternative is better for the
mother, a final question is whether states could likewise require this for
eugenic abortions permitted past the cut-off. Such a requirement would
almost certainly deter doctors from performing late eugenic abortions, be-
cause they would not want to risk further harming a handicapped baby by
burdening it with prematurity. Hence such regulations would effectively
eliminate the eugenic abortion exception. But if the exception itself is jus-
tified, then regulations that negate it should be proscribed. The method
chosen for late eugenic abortions should therefore be a matter for medical
discretion.
IV. POSTSCRIPT: AVOIDING TECHNOLOGICAL DOMINANCE OF LAW
To read Roe as establishing technological survivability as an appropri-
ate cut-off for all time, with no judicial discretion to reassess in light of
medical advances, would make abortion law stand alone in embracing an
unthinking capitulation to scientific technology. The relationship of sci-
ence and law is, in this age of rapid technological progress, an enormous
and complex topic.2 57 Nonetheless, one feature of the relationship is clear:
Although the law must be responsive to scientific advances, it rightfully
must retain control and temper technology with the social values it incor-
porates. This norm-governed relation has been consistently embraced by
courts; perhaps a few brief examples will illustrate how, in other areas,
courts have refused to be guided solely by scientific determinants and have
instead insisted upon invoking the normative center of law.
256. Allowing this sort of an exception is not particularly unusual and is compatible with physi-
cian discretion in implementation. As noted by the Court in Roe, the proposed Uniform Abortion Act
would have allowed: (1) elective abortion until week 20; (2) abortion after that time to protect the
mother's health, to screen out fetal defects, or following rape, incest or illicit intercourse with a girl
under 16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 146-47. Likewise, various other countries have treated eugenic abortions
as special cases. See, e.g., C. TiE7E, supra note 9, at 10 (quoting United Kingdom statute allowing
abortion if child, were it born, would suffer from serious physical or mental abnormalities).
257. See generally SCIENCE AND LAW: AN ESSENTIAL ALLIANCE (W. Thomas ed. 1983); SciEN-
TISTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM (W. Thomas ed. 1974).
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In constitutional adjudication, where weighty rights and interests clash,
empirical standards or standards determined entirely by another discipline
are seldom even remotely plausible. In the First Amendment area, for
example, courts must determine when speech constitutes a clear and pre-
sent danger to the public safety. 58 This is clearly a value judgment: a
proposal to delegate such decisions to experts in psycholinguistics or com-
munications theory would rightfully be greeted with derision. There is
likewise no litmus test for pornography-common sense plus social values
just help judges "know it when [they] see it." '259
A basic tenet of criminal and constitutional law-that insanity vitiates
criminal responsibility-does invoke medical science to help determine
which defendants are insane. Even then, although courts are attentive to
psychological theories and diagnoses, they refuse to be bound by them.
Insanity is a legal and not a medical concept,260 and the crucial issue is
whether the defendant is insane, not whether he is schizophrenic, psycho-
pathic, etc. Thus the stability of criminal law is not shaken by revisions in
psychiatrists' diagnostic manuals, and medical theories and terminology
inform but do not control.2"' As several courts have put it:
Legal tests of criminal insanity are not and cannot be the result of
scientific analysis or objective judgment . . . . They must be based
on the instinctive sense of justice of ordinary men.
62
As a circuit judge, Justice Burger not only emphasized the hazards of
letting experts testify as to the ultimate issue of criminal insanity,
2 63 but
also more generally stated: "[N]o rule of law can possibly be sound or
workable which is dependent upon the terms of another discipline whose
258. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 608-31 (1978) ("clear and pre-
sent danger" doctrine used to distinguish protected speech from unprotected incitement of violent or
illegal conduct).
259. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
24 (1973) (one factor in determining obscenity is whether average person applying contemporary
community standards would find that work as whole appeals to prurient interest).
260. See Tanay, Forensic Psychiatry in the Legal Defense of Murder, in READINGS IN LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY 665, 665-66 (R. Allen, E. Ferster & J. Rubin eds. 1975); see also Shaw, The Mentally
Disordered Offender, in READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, supra, at 347, 352-53.
261. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
262. Id. at 977 n.6; see also Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
Courts likewise listen to psychiatrists in civil commitment proceedings, in hearings to determine com-
petency to stand trial, and in decisions about incompetency for purposes of civil guardianship appoint-
ments, but they nonetheless insist the ultimate decision is a legal one. See Cohn, Standards for Civil
Commitment and the Right to Liberty, in I LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 183,
196 (Litigation and Administrative Practice Series No. 114, 1979) (courts and legislatures recognize
that competence is social and legal, not medical, question); Sadoff, Basic Facts about Mental Illness,
in 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 163, 176 (mental illness not tantamount to
incompetency, because incompetency determinations are judicial, not medical).
263. See Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring).
Vol. 95: 639, 1986
Trimesters and Technology
members are in profound disagreement about what those terms mean. ' '1 64
This principle should not be forgotten in the abortion context: A technol-
ogy-dependent point such as viability should not be the sole determinant
of temporal cut-off points in abortion law.
The fundamental principle that legal decisions, even on highly technical
subjects, must not be dictated by scientific doctrines or determinations be-
cause such a decision making process would ignore relevant non-scientific
values is illustrated in many other areas. These include the degree of def-
erence shown to decisions of the U.S. Patent Office, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA), the treatment of general accounting principles for
purposes of the income tax law, and the tort concept of "proximate
cause." In some of these areas, the judiciary shows great deference to sci-
ence. Nonetheless, the degree of deference that is shown is established by
a judicial choice that itself looks to relevant social values as well as to
science.
Patents promote scientific progress by offering inventors a right of ex-
clusion for a limited time period as an incentive to risk the time and
money necessary for research and development.11 5 Free enterprise would
be impeded, however, if even trivial and obvious refinements in the cur-
rent art were granted exclusionary rights. Thus, to be patentable, an in-
vention must be "non-obvious." 26 Although the issuance of a patent by
the Patent Office creates a presumption of validity,2 7 this scientific deter-
mination is not conclusive of non-obviousness, which is ultimately a ques-
tion of law.2"8 According to one court:
While weight must be given to the presumption of validity . . the
time has long since gone, if it ever existed, when district courts and
courts of appeal could refuse to make an independent assessment of §
103 obviousness in light of all the evidence presented. To criticize a
court for making an independent assessment is to criticize it for do-
ing what the law presently requires. 269
This independent assessment is not simply a fresh evaluation of the scien-
tific evidence. It includes, implicitly or explicitly, a consideration and in-
264. Id. at 860.
265. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
266. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-103 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985). The non-obviousness requirement
is that the invention would not be obvious, in light of all prior art, to someone knowledgeable in the
field. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.
267. Scully Signal Co. v. Electronics Corp. of Am., 570 F.2d 355, 362 (1st Cir. 1977).
268. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A.
Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57, 62 (7th Cir. 1980).
269. Scully Signal Co., 570 F.2d at 362.
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corporation of values, such as free enterprise, that underlie the patent
process.
Just as patent cases may involve the degree of deference to be given
Patent Office determinations, environmental or safe workplace cases may
involve the standard of review for EPA or OSHA decisions.2 70 This some-
what conflates the issues of judicial deference to science and to decisions of
administrative agencies. Nonetheless, the standard for judicial review of
these agencies' determinations 27 1 is relevant: Courts must not "substitute
[their] judgment for that of the agency," 272 but they must engage in a
substantial inquiry into the decision, asking whether it was "based on a
consideration of the relevant factors. 2s73 Such factors, of course, include
not only scientific matters but also social values and policy judgments.
2 4
As the D.C. Circuit has put it: "While we must bow to the acknowledged
expertise of the Administrator in matters technical we should not auto-
matically succumb thereto, overwhelmed as it were by the utter 'scientific-
ity' of the expedition." ' 6 Thus, again, science should not utterly dominate
law.
Science should not dominate law because science and law have different
objectives: "Science seeks truth with impartial objectivity; law seeks a
truth tempered with justice. ' 271 In the tax area, accounting-a dubious
science at best-seeks not pure objectivity but proper and profitable man-
agement for the company. 277 Tax law, on the other hand, has an overrid-
270. Because such agencies are empowered by Congress to make determinations within their area
of expertise, see, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335,
4341-4347 (1982), their decisions are accorded great deference. See Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
271. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967), the Court created a pre-
sumption that Congress intended decisions of administrative agencies to be subject to judicial review
unless it specifically stated otherwise. The Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60
Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) establishes such a presumption of
reviewability. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
272. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc., 401 U.S. at 416.
273. Id.; Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1, 34-35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 547 (1978) (courts must take hard look at administrative actions; review not limited to
whether agency's procedures were proper).
274. In invalidating, by a 5-4 decision, OSHA's standard that decreased permissible exposure to
benzene from 10 parts per million to 1 part per million, the Court emphasized that the policy behind
the Occupational Safety and Health Act was to eliminate significant harm, not to mandate absolute
safety. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petrol Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646-47 (1980); see also W.
RODGERS, ENVJRONMENTAL LAW 744-45 (1977) (courts must determine whether agency gave suffi-
cient weight to environmental values). As one commentator puts it, in reviewing an agency's decision
in this sort of case, a judge "should recognize that the decision being reviewed is at bottom a policy
decision." McGarrity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Sci-
ence Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729, 809 (1979).
275. Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
276. W. Thomas, Scientists and Lawyers: Their Obligation to Cooperate, in ScIErNs'rs IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 257, at 1.
277. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979).
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ing mandate to preserve the revenue.2 78 Thus, although a taxpayer's ad-
herence to generally accepted accounting principles will ordinarily be
found to reflect income, the Tax Commissioner or the court can determine
that, in a particular case, it does not.27 Just as viability is determined by
medical probabilities, about which there is no agreement, the Court has
said of accounting principles:
[G]enerally accepted accounting principles are far from being a ca-
nonical set of rules that will ensure identical accounting treatment of
identical transactions . . . [such principles], rather, tolerate a range
of 'reasonable' treatments, leaving the choice among alternatives to
management.
280
Allowing such principles definitively to determine income would improp-
erly let accountants (and accounting) dictate the terms of the tax law.281
The differing purposes of science and law likewise inform the tort con-
cept of proximate cause. Causation is a scientific, empirical concept. Sci-
entific proof may show, with irrefutable evidence and logic, that a package
dropped at one end of a railroad station caused scales to fall at the other,
thereby injuring poor Mrs. Palsgraf.2"2 But the law may refuse to hold
responsible the railroad attendant who caused the package to drop, be-
cause the result is viewed as too unforeseeable to impose liability.""
Views about liability are more expansive today, but the problem of an act
causing harm that is remote in time or space, or that injures an unforesee-
able plaintiff, is still relevant.28" Even were the scope of tort liability to be
made coextensive with demonstrable causation, such a decision would be
based on societal and judicial values and would not represent a mere ca-
pitulation to science.
Even when a scientific standard is accepted as a legal one, this is done
as a matter of law, after consideration of relevant principles. For example,
the tort rule that the medical profession sets its own standard of
care-that is, that conformity with accepted medical practice is not mal-
practice 285 -is nonetheless a rule of law and potentially subject to change
by law.2 88 Likewise, when doctors, in response to new medical technology,
278. Id. at 543.
279. Id. at 539-40.
280. Id. at 544.
281. Id.
282. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
283. Id. at 346-47, 162 N.E. at 101.
284. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OwENs, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS, 264-65, 272-73, 287 & n.56 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing how these decisions are ones of
social policy).
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revised their definition of death (cessation of cardiac activity) to include
irreversible loss of brain function, 87 the law eventually followed suit, but
it did so as an explicit policy judgment. An influential President's Com-
mission studied the matter, noting that the law's historical deference to the
medical definition of death was itself established as a matter of law. 88 As
to the recommendation to accept "brain death," the President's Commis-
sion relied on scientific knowledge but made clear that science should not
rule:
Biomedical knowledge ought to continue to inform public policy in
revising the legal standards concerning death . . . but, in the end,
the society as a whole must judge that these technical standards and
the opinions they reflect conform to society's settled values and ac-
cepted conceptions of human existence and personal rights. This
judgment will be most clearly expressed through the medium of the
law of the land.2"9
As this very brief discussion shows, law has not been, and should not
be, controlled by science. For while science seeks to be value free, law is
ultimately the articulation of social values. The judicial process cannot
become value-free and remain judicial. 290 That the right to privacy, im-
plicit in the Constitution, extends to a woman's right to abort is a value
judgment, based not solely on interpretation of the views of the Founding
.Fathers, 9 ' but also on today's social values and mores.
2  It is a highly
controversial judgment. But it will not be made less controversial by let-
ting science dictate the dimensions of the abortion right. Rather, just as
the law is responsive to science but is not ruled by it in other areas, the
Supreme Court, and not technology, remains ultimately responsible for
establishing the limitations of the abortion right.
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CONCLUSION
In recognizing an abortion right, the Supreme Court appropriately re-
lied on fundamental societal principles. In defining the contours of the
right, however, it at least appeared to rely too heavily upon technological
facts that were valid in 1973 but that are rapidly becoming obsolete. As
the trimester system's medical foundation erodes, a similar fate for the
abortion right itself is fearfully (or eagerly) being anticipated. But the
abortion right need not suffer such a fate, for the fundamental principles
that support it remain steadfast. If the unarticulated premise behind the
viability standard-that late gestation (not merely survivability) is cru-
cial-is given its due, then abortion law need not be tethered to the tech-
nology upon which fetal viability turns. "Late gestation" can be desig-
nated explicitly, and it can stay still. If Roe is revised (if this ever becomes
necessary) by rethinking the trimester system and recognizing that there is
a time range that represents the earliest period when abortion should, in
our society, be subject to proscription, the spirit of Roe will be retained
while the threat of technological tyranny will finally be vanquished.
